Two medical laboratories (lab 1 and lab 2) join forces to develop a new antibiotic. Each laboratory must decide how many researchers to assign to the joint project. The more researchers they assign to this project, the faster they will be able to develop and supply the new medicine. But, at the same time, other projects will be left on stand-by as they reallocate their staff to the joint project. Laboratory 1 has slightly more expertise in the science that is required for the antibiotic. This is captured assuming that each scientist it assigns to the project can contribute slightly more than those assigned by laboratory 2. Specifically, estimations show that when lab 1 assigns r, researchers and lab 2 assigns r, researchers to the project, it leads to an overall revenue worth €X which is given by X = 120(2r, + r2). Estimations also show that laboratory i faces a cost from having to leave some projects on stand-by which is given by 3(r¡)².
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- Within its first three years, the 2012 Chevy Volt fell in value 62 percent to $12,997 in 2015. And a 2012 Nissan Leaf fell in value 66 percent to $10,220. That’s −22 percent a year, whereas the typical gasoline car depreciates −24, −15, and −12 percent its first three years (51 percent) for a −17 percent average per year. Indeed, at the extreme, a Honda Accord is worth fully 64 percent after three years (−12 percent average per year). Clearly, the steep decline in gasoline prices in 2014 contributed to electric-powered vehicles depreciating recently much faster than gasoline powered vehicles. But hybrid-electric vehicles such as the Nissan Leaf and Chevy Volt and all-electric vehicles such as the Chevy Bolt face another problem as well? 1.) What life cycle cost concept begins raising concerns by year 5 with any electric vehicle (EV)? If that issue affected resale value at year 5, would that affect perceived value-in-use? How exactly?Semi-Salt Industries began its operation in 1975 and remains the only firm in the world that produces and sells commercial-grade polyglutamate. While virtually anyone with a degree in college chemistry could replicate the firm’s formula, due to the relatively high cost, Semi-Salt has decided not to apply for a patent. Despite the absence of patent protection, Semi-Salt has averaged accounting profits of 5.5 percent on investment since it began producing polyglutamate—a rate comparable to the average rate of interest that large banks paid on deposits over this period. Do you think Semi-Salt is earning monopoly profits? Why?Wonopoly and natural resource prices Suppose that a firm is the sole owner of a stock of a natural resource. a. How should the analysis of the maximization of the discounted profits from selling this resource (Equation 17.63 be modified to take this fact into account? b. Suppose that the demand for the resource in question had a constant elasticity form q(t)=a[p(t)]b . How would this change the price dynamics shown in Equation 17.67? c. How would the answer to Problem 17.7 be changed if the entire crude oil supply were owned by a single firm?
- Comment An HHI index of less than 1500 is considered as an competative market place , and If HHI index value is in range of 1500 to 2500 is considered as moderetly Concentrated.if the valuegoes above 2500 then the market place is highly Concentrated. So, In our All three years Value of HHI is above 2500 that shows in all three years that shows the there is very less competation in market or existence of very few players in all three years Are your conclusions in the HHI consistent with the five firm concentration in all cases? Give two reasons to support your answerKaren goes to the casino with 1000$ and plays the following strategy: In her first game, she putsin 1$. If she wins, she finishes playing and takes her profit home. If she looses a game, she willplay another game and put in twice as much money as she did in the previous game. If she wins,she will finish playing and take her profits home. She will keep going with that strategy, untilshe either wins a game or runs out of money.(a) Create a table for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 which lists: (a) The amount of money she puts in in game n;(b) the sum of the amount of money she has put in in all games up to this game n; and (c)her overall profit if the game n is the first game she wins.(b) What is the likelihood of her loosing 8 games in a row?(c) How many games can she loose in a row before she cannot afford to continue with herstrategy of doubling her bet?(d) Given the low likelihood of loosing, is this a smart strategy for Karen to pursue?(Market Entry Deterrence): NSG is considering entry into the local phone market inthe Bay Area. The incumbent S&P, predicts that a price war will result if NSG enters. If NSG staysout, S&P earns monopoly profits valued at $10 million (net present value, or NPV of profits),while NSG earns zero. If NSG enters, it must incur irreversible entry costs of $2 million. If there isa price war, each firm earns $1 million (NPV). S&P always has the option of accommodatingentry (i.e., not starting a price war). In such a case, both firms earn $4 million (NPV). Supposethat the timing is such that NSG first has to choose whether or not to enter the market. ThenS&P decides whether to “accommodate entry” or “engage in a price war.”a. Model this as a dynamic game and draw the game tree.b. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to this sequential game?
- show that expectaion demages are efficient with respect to beach, but no efficient with respect to reliance.Company A is the only supplier of glass in Big Apple City used for tall buildings’ exteriors. Its marginal cost of production is cA=1, and it has no other production costs. The demand for such glass in Big Apple city is QD=2-P. Company B in Jersey City produces the same glass and is considering whether to expand to Big Apple city. If it enters, it needs to get a permit to allow it to be a supplier in the Big-Apple city at a cost of L=0.5, which does not vary with quantity of output, and its marginal cost of production is cB=0.5. If it expands to the Big-Apple city, companies A and B both supply to the market, and the market price P satisfies QA+QB=2-P, where QA is company A’s production level and QB is company B’s. a) If company B expands to the Big-Apple city, what is the resulting price in a Nash equilibrium? b) Company B hires a consulting company to advise whether it should expand to the Big-Apple city. If you’re running the consulting company, what is your advice? Explain your…C2) Company A is the only supplier of glass in Big Apple City used for tall buildings’ exteriors. Its marginal cost of production is cA=1, and it has no other production costs. The demand for such glass in Big Apple city is QD=2-P. Company B in Jersey City produces the same glass and is considering whether to expand to Big Apple city. If it enters, it needs to get a permit to allow it to be a supplier in the Big-Apple city at a cost of L=0.5, which does not vary with quantity of output, and its marginal cost of production is cB=0.5. If it expands to the Big-Apple city, companies A and B both supply to the market, and the market price P satisfies QA+QB=2-P, where QA is company A’s production level and QB is company B’s. a) If company B expands to the Big-Apple city, what is the resulting price in a Nash equilibrium? b) Company B hires a consulting company to advise whether it should expand to the Big-Apple city. If you’re running the consulting company, what is your advice? Explain…
- Firm 1 must decide whether to enter an industry in which firm 2 is an incumbent. To enter this industry, firm 1 must choose to build elther a plant with a small output capacity (S), or large output capacity (L). A plant with small capacity costs $50 to set up; one with large capacity cost $175. In either case, the marginal cost of production is zero. But firm 1 can also opt to stay out (0), in which case it does not incur any type of cost. Firm 2 is able to observe firm 1's decision before deciding whether to expand or not its initial small output capacity operation. Expanding (E) costs firm 2 $76, whereas not expanding (N) incurs no cost for the firm. In either case, the marginal cost of production is also zero. The revenues under the different scenarios are given below. - It only one small firm exists, its revenue is $80, the other earns zero. - if two small firms exist, each earns revenue of $70. - If only one large firm exists, its revenue is $200, the other earns zero. - If…Two rival communications companies (Alpha and Beta) are both considering bringing out a revolutionary 8G wireless technology. Unfortunately, the costs of development are so high that the potential market could only support one firm. Both companies understand these possible outcomes. If one firm enters the 8G market and the other does not, the entering firm will receive $500 billion in profits over the next 5 years; the other firm will receive $100 billion over the same 5 years (by concentrating on their current 5G service). If neither enters the 8G field, they can both expect to receive $75 billion over the 5-year period, as they fight over the 5G market. Lastly, if both enter the 8G market, each will end up suffering a $50 billion loss over the same 5 years. Use a game table with “ENTER” and “STAY OUT” to decide each player’s options and the payoffs. Explain why each company has a strong reason to want to announce its intentions before the other company announces theirs.The two major scooter companies in India, ABC and XYZ, are competing for a fixed market. If both manufacturers make major model changes in a year, then their percentage market share not change. Also, if they both do not make major model changes, their percentage market share remains constant. If ABC makes a major model change and XYZ does not, then ABC is able to take away a% of the market away from XYZ, and if XYZ makes a major model change ABC does not, XYZ is able to take away b% of the market away from ABC. Express this as a 2 x 2 game and solve for the optimal strategy for each of the companies.