Under standard Bertrand competition between identical firms in a single market where the firm with the lowest price takes the entire market (assume the price is non-negative real number), O Firms can make positive profits in equilibrium There is a unique equilibrium in which both firms charge the price equals to marginal cost O Firms make zero profit, but price may be above the marginal cost None of the other choices is correct

Under standard Bertrand competition between identical firms in a single market where the firm with the lowest price takes the entire market (assume the price is non-negative real number), O Firms can make positive profits in equilibrium There is a unique equilibrium in which both firms charge the price equals to marginal cost O Firms make zero profit, but price may be above the marginal cost None of the other choices is correct

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.4P

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