Figure A Competitive Firm1.2 MC ATC Given P1 = $7.00 P2 = $8.50 P3 =$9.20 Q1= 100.00 AVC P3 P2 P1 MR C Quantity Q1 Refer to Figure A Competitive Firm1.2. At an output level of Q1, the losses is about O No answer text provided. O No answer text provided. O $240 $220 %24

Figure A Competitive Firm1.2 MC ATC Given P1 = $7.00 P2 = $8.50 P3 =$9.20 Q1= 100.00 AVC P3 P2 P1 MR C Quantity Q1 Refer to Figure A Competitive Firm1.2. At an output level of Q1, the losses is about O No answer text provided. O No answer text provided. O $240 $220 %24

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter10: Prices, Output, And Strategy: Pure And Monopolistic Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3E

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Return to Figure 9.2. Suppose P0 is $10 and P1 is$11. Suppose a new firm with the same LRAC curve asthe incumbent tries to break into the market by selling4,000 units of output. Estimate from the graph what thenew firm’s average cost of producing output would be.If the incumbent continues to produce 6,000 units, howmuch output would the two firms supply to the market?Estimate what would happen to the market price as aresult of the supply of both the incumbent firm andthe new entrant. Approximately how much profit wouldeach firm earn?
A food manufacturer is trying to maximize profit by selling wheat-based cereal (C) and wheat bread(B) with raw wheat (W). The production functions are: Cereal: C = 28WC – 1.5WC2 Bread: B = 66WB – 2WB2 Constraint: WC + WB = 7,058 Profit is $1.00 per box of cereal and $0.50 per pack of wheat bread. There are 7,058 units of raw wheat available. How much wheat should go to the cereal (WC)? Enter as a value. ROUND TO THE NEAREST WHOLE NUMBER.
True/False 1. In a principal-agent relationship between owner and manager with hidden e§ort, the owner can design a wage scheme that insures the optimal Örst best e§ort by the manager regardless of the risk aversion of the manager. Justify your answer. 2. Consider a monopoly that faces an inverse demand curve and has a linear cost function. The monopoly would be indi§erent when maximizing proÖts between either choosing quantities or choosing prices. 3. A multiproduct Örm that as monopoly power over several products sets lower prices than separate Örms (each controlling a single product) when the products are substitutes or when there are economies of scope. 4. In the dominant Örm model (‡ la Hotelling) an increase in the marginal cost of the dominant Örm (with constant marginal costs) implies that proÖts necessarily decrease. 5. Suppose that an industry has 10 Örms where the market shares are ordered from the most to the least dominant Örm f0:5; 0:37; 0:05; 0:03; 0:02; 0:01;…
COURSE: MICROECONOMICS - Cournot Model:In the market for a given good there are only 2 firms satisfying the demand, and their respective total cost functions respond to the form: CTi = 10Qi + 5 and the demand is estimated to be: P = 31 - QIf the decision variable for both firms is that the quantity they will produce and realize will be decided simultaneously it is asked to:(a) calculate the profit and reaction function of each firmb) graph market equilibriumc) calculate the profits that both companies will obtain in equilibrium
2. Compute the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits for both firms. Consider now the first stage. 3. Show that in equilibrium firms will go for a maximal quality difference. (Hint: take partial of equilibrium profits with respect to s2 − s1) 4. If you were a lobbyist for firm 1, as a business strategy would you argue to the policymakers to introduce legislation – in the name of safety and quality of course – that increases or decreases the value of c?
. (Requires calculus). In the model of a dominant firm, assume that the fringe supply curve is given by Q = -1 + 0.2P, where P is market price and Q is output. Demand is given by Q = 11 – P.What will price and output be if there is no dominant firm? Now assume that there is a dominant firm, whose marginal cost is constant at $6. Derive the residual demand curve that it faces and calculate its profit-maximizing output and price. highest bidder, but both the winning and losing bidders must pay her their bids. So if Jones bids $1 they pay a total of $3, but Jones gets the money, leaving him with a net gain of $98 and Smith with -$1. If both bid the same amount, the $100 is split evenly between them. Assume that each of them has only two $1 bills on hand, leaving three possible bids: $0, $1 or $2. Write out the payoff matrix for this game, and then find its Nash equilibrium.
Comment An HHI index of less than 1500 is considered as an competative market place , and If HHI index value is in range of 1500 to 2500 is considered as moderetly Concentrated.if the valuegoes above 2500 then the market place is highly Concentrated. So, In our All three years Value of HHI is above 2500 that shows in all three years that shows the there is very less competation in market or existence of very few players in all three years Are your conclusions in the HHI consistent with the five firm concentration in all cases? Give two reasons to support your answer
Acme Drug Co. has a patent on the drug A-rene, the annual demand for which can be described by the demand curve: Q = 4500 - 300P. Production of the drug requires an annual fixed cost of $3,000 and a per unit marginal cost of $5. (i) How many units of the drug will Acme produce each year, and what price will it charge, in order to maximize its profits? What will be its annual profits? (ii) Now suppose that the Better Drug Co. has discovered B-rene, a new drug which seems to be identical to A-rene in all its effects. If Better enters the market, competition with Acme will conform to a Cournot duopoly. Better’s costs are identical to those of Acme. What would be the equilibrium outcome of this duopoly? Specifically, how much would each firm produce and what would be the price? How much profit would each firm make? Would Better find it profitable to enter the market? (iii) Would it be in the interests of society as a whole for Better Drug to enter into production? Identify the gainers and…
Karen goes to the casino with 1000$ and plays the following strategy: In her first game, she putsin 1$. If she wins, she finishes playing and takes her profit home. If she looses a game, she willplay another game and put in twice as much money as she did in the previous game. If she wins,she will finish playing and take her profits home. She will keep going with that strategy, untilshe either wins a game or runs out of money.(a) Create a table for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 which lists: (a) The amount of money she puts in in game n;(b) the sum of the amount of money she has put in in all games up to this game n; and (c)her overall profit if the game n is the first game she wins.(b) What is the likelihood of her loosing 8 games in a row?(c) How many games can she loose in a row before she cannot afford to continue with herstrategy of doubling her bet?(d) Given the low likelihood of loosing, is this a smart strategy for Karen to pursue?
In a typical product mix model, where a companymust decide how much of each product to produceto maximize profit, there are sometimes customerdemands for the products. We used upper-boundconstraints for these: Don’t produce more than youcan sell. Would it be realistic to have lower-boundconstraints instead: Produce at least as much as isdemanded? Would it be realistic to have both (wherethe upper bounds are greater than the lower bounds)?Would it be realistic to have equality constraints:Produce exactly what is demanded?
As an international manager of a US business that has just developed, I would export the computer from the US because I will have full control of how the computer will be manufactured and distributed to Europe. Another pro that I would consider to export from the US is that the patent would be able to protect the design of the computer, which will reduce the result of the property being an infringement. A con from exporting from the United States that it would cost more money from the taxes, duties, and the trade barriers that are from Western Europe. Another con would be that it would take much longer to exist something from over seas. First, I will start with the cons of the process where you might not have full control over the manufacturing process, which can really impact the product of the computer. This can significantly be a bad idea. A pro of having to license a European firm to manufacture and market the computer in Europe would be how they know all of the distribution…
Assume the cost of producing the goods is zero and each consumer will purchase each good as long as the price is less than or equal to value. Consumer values are the entries in the table. Good X Consumer A Consumer B $3,300 $2,900 Good Y $2,500 $3,400 What is the company's total profit from selling the goods bundled together? OA. $12,600 OB. $10,800 O C. $11.600 OD. $13,400