(game theory)Consider the following game in which player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a column C R T 3,1 0,5 1, 2 M 4, 2 8, 7 6, 4 5,7 5,8 2, 5 a) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? b) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? c) What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? Is it ever possible for either player to use a strategy other than his dominant strategy? Explain.

(game theory)Consider the following game in which player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a column C R T 3,1 0,5 1, 2 M 4, 2 8, 7 6, 4 5,7 5,8 2, 5 a) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? b) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? c) What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? Is it ever possible for either player to use a strategy other than his dominant strategy? Explain.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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1. Solve for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game above. Explain carefully how you solve for it. 2. In the equilibrium you calculated above, what is the probability that both consoles are released in October? In December? What are the expected payoffs of firm A and of firm B in equilibrium?
QUESTION 1: Game theory a) What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? b) Is this a socially optimal outcome? If not, which outcome is preferred? c) Do all three solution approaches for simultaneous games work independently (not together)? If not, which do not? d) Draw the game as a game tree (extensive form). e) Switch the payoffs in cells (A, A) and (D, D). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one?
60B- What is the Nash equilibrium for this game and identify the profit each player gets at this solution 5 m
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Game Theory a) Consider the following game represented by the game tree below. If you observe Blue Bank playing medium and Green Bank playing bottom, would you be surprised by their choices? Carefully explain why or why not. b) Now assume that Blue and Green Banks play the game with the same actions and payoffs as in a) but they make their choices simultaneously. What is the payoff matrix for this new game? What do you predict will happen in the game? Explain. c) Assume that the game from part a) is played five times, i.e. Blue and Green Banks play a repeated game with the stage game described in a). What do you predict will happen in the game? Explain.
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