If a game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium then which of the following statements is true? O There is at least two pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There are at least two rationalizable strategies. Players prefer any pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Players always prefer to mix when the other player mixes. None of the above.

If a game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium then which of the following statements is true? O There is at least two pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There are at least two rationalizable strategies. Players prefer any pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Players always prefer to mix when the other player mixes. None of the above.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

If a game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium then which of the following statements is true? There is at least two pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There are at least two rationalizable strategies. Players prefer any pure strategy Nash equilibrium to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Players always prefer to mix when the other player mixes. None of the above.
A Nash Equilibrium is the equilibrium of a game in which; Both players get the largest payoff amount Both players get the best payoff independent of what the other players choices are Both player, with the knowledge of what the other players possible moves are, do not have incentive to deviate from their strategy There is incomplete information of the game and each player makes the move that is best for them and their payoff outcome
Nash equilibrium refers to the optimal outcome of a game where there is no incentive for the players to deviate from their initial strategy. An individual (or player) can receive no incremental benefit from changing actions, assuming other players remain constant in their strategies. Given this premise, can there be a no Nash equilibrium?
Which of the following is true for a two-person game which has a Nash equilibrium? The game may or may not have a dominant-strategy equilibrium. Only one of the two players will have a dominant strategy. The game must have a dominant-strategy equilibrium. The dominant strategy of the players must be different.
If a player does not have a dominant strategy, can the game still have a Nash equilibrium? No. At least one player must have a dominant strategy for the outcome to be a Nash equilibrium. Yes. There is no need for a dominant strategy to exist in order to have a Nash equilibrium. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium because each player has made his or her optimal choice based on the optimal choice of the other player. No. If there is no dominant strategy, there is no predictable outcome and therefore no Nash equilibrium. Yes. A Nash equilibrium is possible only if neither player has a dominant strategy. If a dominant strategy exists, it is no longer a Nash equilibrium.
in every Nash equilibrium, the strategy of every player is a best response to the strategies chosen by the other players. (a) True. (b) False.
If a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, there is at least one player that could achieve higher payoffs by deviating.(a) True. (b) False.
Consider the following game. Which one of the following statements is TRUE? 1. There are 8 subgames for this extensive-form game. 2. There are 8 proper subgames for this extensive-form game. 3. There is no Subgame Nash Equilibrium for this game. 4. There exists some Subgame Nash Equilibrium that gives the payoff 7 to Player 1 and 3 to Player 2.
Which of the following statements about a Nash equilibrium is not correct? A. Each player plays a best response to opponents' Nash strategies. B. No player has a profitable unilateral deviation. C. For each finite noncoopertiave game there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. D. A game has at least two players. Which one of the following statements is incorrect? A. For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction. B. A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation. C. A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. D. A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation. Which one of the following statements is correct? A. A supergame cannot have any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. B. A supergame can only have finite number of subgame perfect Nash…
Consider a coordination game where each of two agents picks a number between 1 and 1000. The players get a prize of $1000 each if their numbers are the same, and $0 otherwise. In this game, there exists(A) a thousand of pure-strategy Nash equilibria;(B) an iterated dominant-strategy equilibrium;(C) a dominant strategy equilibrium;(D) none of the above.
Find any Nash equilibria in the game below. Firm B Co-operate Don’t co-operate Firm A Co-operate 60 60 0 80 Don’t co-operate 80 0 10 10 Answer a. There is one Nash equilibrium: both firms don't co-operate. b. There are no Nash equilibria. c. There are two Nash equilibria: one firm co-operates and the other firm doesn't co-operate. d. There are two Nash equilibria: (i) both firms co-operate and (ii) both firms don't co-operate.
Which of the following best describes Nash equilibrium? a) A situation where one player dominates the others b) A situation where each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of the others c) A situation where all players cooperate perfectly d) A situation where players change strategies constantly