EconomicsConsider a Cournot competition with N identicalfirms, each having MC=0 and FC=0. Inversedemand is P=10-Q. Which of the following is true?(several answers are allowed, wrong answers arepenalized!).Select one or more:a. As N increases total market quantity increasesb. As N increases profit per firm decreasesC. As N inreases the sum of all firms profits remainsunchangedd. As N increases market price decreasesConsider a Cournot competition with N identical firms, each having MC=0 and FC=0.Inverse demand is P=10-Q. Which of the following is true? (several answers are allowed,wrong answers are penalized!).Select one or more:a. As N increases total market quantity increasesb. As N increases profit per firm decreasesc. As N inreases the sum of all firms profits remains unchangedd. As N increases market price decreases

Usually there are two firms in cournot model, the firm competes on quantities.

nsider a Cournot competition with N identical ns, each having MC=Ò and FC=0. Inverse mand is P=1O-Q. Which of the following is true veral answers are allowed, wrong answers are nalized!). lect one or more: As N increases total market quantity increases As N increases profit per firm decreases As N inreases the sum of all firms profits remair changed As N increases market price decreases onsider a Cournot competition with N identical firms, each having MC=0 and FC=0. verse demand is P=10-Q. Which of the following is true? (several answers are allowed,

nsider a Cournot competition with N identical ns, each having MC=Ò and FC=0. Inverse mand is P=1O-Q. Which of the following is true veral answers are allowed, wrong answers are nalized!). lect one or more: As N increases total market quantity increases As N increases profit per firm decreases As N inreases the sum of all firms profits remair changed As N increases market price decreases onsider a Cournot competition with N identical firms, each having MC=0 and FC=0. verse demand is P=10-Q. Which of the following is true? (several answers are allowed,

Economics:

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285859460

Author:BOYES, William

Publisher:BOYES, William

Chapter28: Antitrust And Regulation

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3E

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