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- COURSE: MICROECONOMICS - Cournot Model:In the market for a given good there are only 2 firms satisfying the demand, and their respective total cost functions respond to the form: CTi = 10Qi + 5 and the demand is estimated to be: P = 31 - QIf the decision variable for both firms is that the quantity they will produce and realize will be decided simultaneously it is asked to:(a) calculate the profit and reaction function of each firmb) graph market equilibriumc) calculate the profits that both companies will obtain in equilibriumCOURSE: MICROECONOMICS - Stackelberg ModelIn a given market good there are only 2 firms that satisfy the demand, and their respective total cost functions are: CTi = 400 and the demand that is estimated is P = 120 - 2QIf the exception variable of both firms is the quantity they will produce, such that the decisions to produce are made sequentially firm number 1 will be the leader who decides the quantity to produce and firm number 2 (follower) decides based on the production of firm number 1, we ask:(a) quantity produced by each firm and its equilibrium price in the market.(b) Profit of each company at equilibrium and (c) Graph your resultsSuppose you run a marketing survey and find you have two types of customers high-value customers willing to pay 16 and low-va consumers willing to pay just 10. Your survey tells you that there are equal numbers of high- and low- value customers. Obviously , have two possible options price high (16) and sell only to the high value group, or price low (10) and sell to everyoneThe costs incurred is 5 per unit and sales only happen to high -value consumers 50 % of the timeWhich price should you choose ? Select the correct response price high price low it depends price both high and low
- Suppose you are the economic adviser ofa company producing three brands of mobile pnones;Nokia 10, Samsung X and iPhone 7. Suppose further that, your company currently sells 120units of iPhone Z at e800 per unit, 150 units of Samsung X at e800 per unit and 200 units ofNokia 10 at e100 per unit, but in a bid to maximize profit, the company's managing directorproposes an increase in price of Samsung X from e800 to e1000 per unit for which quantitydemanded is anticipated to fall from 150 to 100 units; iPhone Z from e800 to e 1200 per unitfor which quantity demanded is anticipated to fall from 120 to 100 units; and Nokia 10 from100 to 200 per unit for which quantity demanded is expected to fall from 200 to 100 unitsUsing the mid-polint formula. compute the price elasticity of demand for each brand.From your answer in i, what is the type and economic interpretatiom of each brand'sii.value of elasticity.. When Chinese automakers began exporting cars, rather thanfocusing on developed nations in the West, they shippedautos to emerging markets in countries such as Algeria, Russia,Chile, and South Africa. In these markets, even used vehiclesfrom multinational manufacturers are relatively scarce—andrelatively expensive. The Chinese automakers, who prioritizelow cost rather than design or even safety, applied a penetration-pricing strategy. A woman in Santiago, Chile, who boughta new Chery S21 explained, “The price factor is fairly decisive.I paid $5,500 new and full. Toyota with similar features costsaround $12,000.” Why do you think Chinese automakerschose that pricing strategy? Do you think it was successful?As Chinese regulators pressure these manufacturers to maketheir cars safer, do you think they will be able to keep theirprices low compared with those of the international automakers? Why or why not?26Melanie and Oli are competing Pacific halibut fishers. Both have been allocated ITQs that limit their catch to 1,000 tons of Pacific halibut each. Melanie's cost per ton is $20; Oli's cost per ton is $28.Refer to the information given and assume that the market price of Pacific halibut is $40 per ton. If Melanie pays Oli $10 per ton for his ITQs and then catches her new limit of 2,000 tons, their combined profit would be: $28,000. $32,000. $40,000. $54,000.
- Suppose a manufacturer of exercise equipmentsets a suggested price to the consumer of $395 fora particular piece of equipment to be competitivewith similar equipment. The manufacturer sells itsequipment to a sporting goods wholesaler who receives 25 percent of the selling price and a retailerwho receives 50 percent of the selling price. Whatdemand-oriented pricing approach is being used,and at what price will the manufacturer sell theequipment to the wholesaler?Suppose that an incumbent can commit to producing a large quantity of outputbefore the potential entrant decides whether to enter. So, the incumbent Örst chooseswhether to produce a small quantity or a large quantity. The rival then decides whether toenter. If the incumbent commits to the small output level and if the rival does not enter,the rival makes $0 and the incumbent makes $900. If it does enter, the rival makes $125and the incumbent earns $450. If the incumbent commits to producing the large quantity,and the potential entrant stays out of the market, the potential entrant makes $0 and theincumbent makes $800. If the rival enters, the best the entrant can make is $0, the sameamount it would earn if it didnít enter, but the incumbent earns only $400. Show the gametree. What is the SPNE?(Market Entry Deterrence): NSG is considering entry into the local phone market inthe Bay Area. The incumbent S&P, predicts that a price war will result if NSG enters. If NSG staysout, S&P earns monopoly profits valued at $10 million (net present value, or NPV of profits),while NSG earns zero. If NSG enters, it must incur irreversible entry costs of $2 million. If there isa price war, each firm earns $1 million (NPV). S&P always has the option of accommodatingentry (i.e., not starting a price war). In such a case, both firms earn $4 million (NPV). Supposethat the timing is such that NSG first has to choose whether or not to enter the market. ThenS&P decides whether to “accommodate entry” or “engage in a price war.”a. Model this as a dynamic game and draw the game tree.b. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to this sequential game?
- As the new general manager of the Grand Palladium Jamaica luxury all-inclusive resort, youare assessing your pricing policies. Currently, the price of a weekend stay is $2,000 perguest. You estimate the marginal cost of serving a guest at $1,600, and while yourpredecessor unfortunately did not leave you data from the pricing experiments and testmarketing she performed, you do know that such experiments were done, and that yourpredecessor was competent.a. What is your best estimate of the elasticity of demand for a weekend stay at the GrandPalladium?b. Your learned that at the current price, the resort is only 80% full on the weekends.Remembering the sense of belonging that you experienced in a crowded subway duringthe rush hour, you contemplate lowering the price so the resort is completely full. What isyour back-of-the-envelope calculation for how much you need to lower the price?c. After some thought you cooled to the idea of full occupancy. Instead, you focused yourenergy and…** Please be advsed that this is practice only from previous yeasr *** Answers: (a) There are no Nash equilibria.(b) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and no mixed strategy Nash equilibria.(c) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 1/2.(d) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 1/2 and q = 3/4.(e) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibra, one with (H,H) and another with (L,L), and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria with p = 3/4 and q = 1/2.We now consider a duopoly model where the firms offer products with different qualitiesand consumers differ from each other in how much they care for quality. Suppose the firms offer their products with quality si ∈ [0, 1] and consumers’ ‘location’ in terms ofhow much they care about quality is given by a parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] and consumers are uniformlydistributed over this interval. Suppose the firms first choose their quality s1 and s2 and then setprices p1 and p2. A consumer of type θ derives utilityvi = r − pi + θsifrom consuming a unit from firm i and where reservation price r is high enough that everyonepurchases from one of the two firms. Suppose the marginal cost of producing increases with quality.There are no fixed costs and the total variable cost isC(qi, si) = csiqiso that marginal cost is csi and increases with quality. Further, let c = 1 so marginal cost is siConsider the second stage where given a choice of qualities s1 and s2 with s1 < s2, the firmssimultaneously…