p=200-2q, re q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiate arately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What mbership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per vw much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? profit-maximizing membership fee (Elis (Enter your response as a whole number..

p=200-2q, re q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiate arately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee as many rounds as he wants at $20, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What mbership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per vw much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? profit-maximizing membership fee (Elis (Enter your response as a whole number..

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter6: Demand Relationships Among Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6.14P

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b) The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does theclub earn by using two-part pricing?c) Joe marries Susan, who is also an enthusiastic golfer. Susan wants to join the Northlands Club.The manager believes that Susan’s inverse demand function is ? = 100 − 2?. The manager has apolicy of offering each member of a married couple the same two-part prices, so he offers themboth a new deal. What two-part pricing deal maximizes the club’s profit?d) Will this new pricing have a higher or lower access fee and per-unit fee than in Joe’s originaldeal? How much more would the club make if it charged Susan and Joe separate prices?
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