Player 1 Player 2 Player 2 R. Player 1 Player 1 Player 1 Player 1 1,2 3,0 1,2 2,1 0,3 2,2 0,3 2,1 The above game is played. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? O Player 1 plays L, Player 2 plays L. Player 1 plays a. O Player 1 plays L, Player 2 plays R, Player 1 plays b. O Player 1 plays R, Player 2 plays L, Player 1 plays a. O None of the above

Player 1 Player 2 Player 2 R. Player 1 Player 1 Player 1 Player 1 1,2 3,0 1,2 2,1 0,3 2,2 0,3 2,1 The above game is played. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? O Player 1 plays L, Player 2 plays L. Player 1 plays a. O Player 1 plays L, Player 2 plays R, Player 1 plays b. O Player 1 plays R, Player 2 plays L, Player 1 plays a. O None of the above

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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Consider the following two-player game.First, player 1 selects a number x≥0. Player 2 observes x. Then, simultaneously andindependently, player 1 selects a number y1 and player 2 selects a number y2, at which pointthe game ends.Player 1’s payoff is: u1(x; y1) = −3y21 + 6y1y2 −13x2 + 8xPlayer 2’s payoff is: u2(y2) = 6y1y2 −6y22 + 12xy2Draw the game tree of this game and identify its Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Daniel and Kevin are two hardworking builders for solo, independently-owned companies. They can produce Chairs and Tables. As a result, they each have PPFs (Possibilities Production Frontiers) that illustrate their production. Daniel's PPF is shown by the equation: Qc = 12 - 3Qt. Likewise, Kevin's PPF is shown by the equation: Qt = 12 - 3Qc. Since they trust each other and are honest in their terms, Daniel and Kevin trade with each other and only each other; they do not take their goods to markets, and they do not interact with outside sellers/buyers. Since they want to make sure that they provide for their families in the most fair way possible, they set up and agree upon a few terms of trade. The terms are as follows: FIRST, the terms of trade are 1 Chair in exchange for 1 Table. SECOND, each of them specializes according to their own comparative advantage. THIRD, since Kevin needs a few extra things, he CONSUMES 3 units of the goods that he produces. With that said, I have a few…
3. Suppose that the various Balls of basketball or internet fame Lavar, Lamelo, Liangelo, Lonzo,and Spalding are considering playing in a 1-on-1 tournament. They get a payoff of 0 if theydecide not to participate. The following table illustrates their payoffs across the variousscenarios. 1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4 Players 5 Players Lavar 10 4 2 -2 -5 Lamelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Liangelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Lonzo 10 8 7 6 5 Spalding 10 9 8 7 6 a. Find and describe all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.b. Suppose now Spalding, since it is in fact a literal basketball, gets a payoff of 0 in anycircumstance, being an inanimate object. The table is now as follows: 1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4Players 5 Players Lavar 10 4 2 -2 -5 Lamelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Liangelo 10 7 5 2 -1 Lonzo 10 8 7 6 5 Spalding 0 0 0 0 0 Find and describe all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
Sadaam Hussein is deciding where to hide his weapons of mass destruction(WMD), while the United Nations is deciding where to look for them. Thepayoff to Hussein from successfully hiding WMD is 5 and from havingthem found is 2. For the UN, the payoff to finding WMD is 9 and from notfinding them is 4. Hussein can hide them in facility X, Y, or Z. The UNinspection team has to decide which facilities to check. Because the inspectors are limited in terms of time and personnel, they cannot check allfacilities.a. Suppose the UN has two pure strategies: It can either inspect facilitiesX and Y (both of which are geographically close to each other) orinspect facility Z. Find a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.b. Suppose the UN can inspect any two facilities, so that it has three purestrategies. The UN can inspect X and Y, X and Z, or Y and Z. Find aNash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Economics: Industrial Economics Question: 1 Consider the following simultaneous move game: Player 1 selects rows and player 2 selects columns in a simultaneous move game. For every outcome, payoffs for player 1 are given by the first entry and payoffs for player 2 by the second. P1\P2 | A | B | C | D | 1 | (5,5) | (7,4) | (7,5) | (1,2) | 2 | (7,2) | (7,3) | (5,1) | (2,3) | 3 | (1,2) | (6,9) | (8,0) | (8,8) | The Nash Equilibrium is: Choices: A. (2,B) B. (3,D) C. (3,B) D. (1,C) Question: 2 In the patent pooling model, if there are four inputs that are required for production of the final goods and each one is produced by a patent-holding monopolist then 1. At the Nash Equilibrium the Lerner Index for the industry isChoices: A. Half as high as the Lerner index that would arise...B. Twice as high as the Lerner Index that would arise...C. Four times higher than the Lerner Index that we...D. Four times lower than the Lerner Index that we... 2. If the market for the final good were a…
53. The Indiana University basketball team trails by twopoints with eight seconds to go and has the ball. Shouldit attempt a two-point shot or a three-point shot?Assume that the Indiana shot will end the game and thatno foul will occur on the shot. Assume that a three-pointshot has a 30% chance of success, and atwo-point shot has a 55% chance of success. Finally,assume that Indiana has a 55% chance of winning inovertime.
1. Write situations that can present the different barriers at communicationand ways to avoid these.BarriersExample SituationPossible Strategy that canbe used to AvoidMisunderstanding1. Physical Barier2. Semantic Barrier3. PsychologicalBarrier4. Mechanical Barrier5. Cultural Bonet II Identity the nonverbal cues present in eoch situation and underline thewords that links to it. 1. She always wears her bracelet when she joins any contest._2. The reason of avoiding her because of ourmisunderstanding3. Brion likes to pinch my cheeks all the time.-4. The aroma of his cottee wakes her up in the morning_5. Her dance moves really prove that she's a dancer6. Those students who are wearing long sleeves and grayskirt are Tourism students.7. She received a lot of medals in her graduation8. Her parents told him to wait Celine reaches 18 years old,so that he can finally court her.9. Jenna and Kaye can't be separated in their classroom10. His smiles can brighten up my day!
12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?
Kayla and Kevin are friends who go together to a used textbook seller who has two copies ofthe biology book that they both need for their class this semester. The cost to the seller ofacquiring the books was $25 each and no other students will need this book. Kayla states thatshe is willing to pay $40 for the book, while Kevin says he is willing to pay $80. Which ofthe following describes the most likely conclusion to this scenario? Group of answer choices The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $40 each because if they tried tocharge Kevin a higher price, Kayla would engage in arbitrage. The seller will sell one book to Kayla for $40 and one book to Kevin for $80 because thismarket meets all three requirements for price discrimination. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $80 each because Kevin's highervalue exceeds Kayla's willingness to pay. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $25 each because that is howmuch the…
12.3 Armed Conflict: Consider the following strategic situation: Two rival armies plan to seize a disputed territory. Each army's general can choose either to attack (A) or to not attack (N). In addition, each army is either strong (S) or weak (W) with equal probability, and the realizations for each army are independent. Furthermore the type of each army is known only to that army's general. An army can capture the territory if either (i) it attacks and its rival does not or (ii) it and its rival attack, but it is strong and the rival is weak. If both attack and are of equal strength then neither captures the territory. As for payoffs, the territory is worth m if captured and each army has a cost of fighting equal to s if it is strong and w if it is weak, where s <w. If an army attacks but its rival does not, no costs are borne by either side. Identify all 12.7 Exercises • 267 the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game for the following two cases, and briefly describe…
Assume that before trading, you are producing 40 crates of apples and 30 oranges. Your neighbor is producing 240 crates of apples and 20 oranges. Label these points on your PPFs from parts a and C pt a: You have an apple orchard and have recently added a small plot of land for oranges as well. In a growing season you have the capacity to harvest 100 crates of apples, or 50 of oranges. Draw your Production Possibilities Frontier, with oranges on the x axis, assuming that the opportunity cost of producing oranges remains constant. Pt c:Your neighbor also grows oranges and apples. In a season they are capable of harvesting 300 crates of apples, or 100 of oranges. Draw their PPF, with oranges on the x axis, again assuming that the opportunity cost of producing oranges remains constant.
In the movie Rebel Without a Cause, James Dean and Buzz Gunderson compete for thefavours of sixteen year old Judy. Buzz's gang members steal two cars. The group of teenagers gathers on aLos Angeles lookout, with a cliff that drops down to the Pacific Ocean. James and Buzz are to drive the stolencars toward the cliff. The first person to jump from his car is declared the chicken (which is bad). The lastperson to jump is the hero (which is good), capturing Judy's affection and the gang's respect. The driverlesscars continue over the cliff and plunge to the rocks at its base.Each driver can make two possible actions. Jump when he feels endangered (be a chicken) or jump AFTERthe other driver jumps (be a rooster). Assuming that both feel endangered at the same moment, the followingmatrix represents the payoffs for James and Buzz for each choice of strategy.BuzzChicken RoosterJames Chicken 3, 3 -10, 20Rooster 20, -10 -50, -50 PLEASE ANSWER THE BELOW QUESTION WITH REFERECE TO THE ABOVE…