Q1Market-clearing PricesConsider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). PositionT receives rT = 150 clicks per day and position B receives TB = 50 clicks per day. There arefour bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: vị = 8, v2 = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2.(a) Find the efficient assignment.(b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices.(c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices.(d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.

Different parties may bid for the right to buy an item or service at an auction.Auctions are seen to…

Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives ¤7 = 150 clicks per day and position B receives rB = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: v1 = 8, vz = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2. %3D (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices. (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.

Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives ¤7 = 150 clicks per day and position B receives rB = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: v1 = 8, vz = 6, v3 = 4, v4 = 2. %3D (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices. (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9MC

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