E2 and the senior demand function for dinners is:Q=180-2P.The marginal cost of a dinner is constant at $20.Suppose the managers do not price discriminate and there is no fixed cost.The price they will charge per dinner is $(Round your answer to two decimal places.)(Hint: The demand curve in this case will have a kink in it at the price at which the senior demand is first positive so that the quantity they demand needs tobe added to the quantity the adults demand. The kink creates a jump in the marginal revenue curve at this quantity.)Suppose the managers do price discriminate.The price they will charge adults is $The quantity of dinners they will sell to adults is, and the quantity of dinners they will sell to seniors isSuppose there is no fixed cost.per dinner, and the price they will charge seniors is $ per dinner. (Round your answer to two decimal places.)The restaurant's economic profit if the managers charge one price is $The restaurant's economic profit if the managers engage in price discrimination is $(Round your answers to two decimal places.)Do the managers want to price discriminate?The managers of an upscale seafood restaurant have determined that adult and senior diners have different demands. The adult demand function fordinners is:and the senior demand function for dinners is:a=200-PQ=180-2P.The marginal cost of a dinner is constant at $20.Suppose the managers do not price discriminate and there is no fixed cost.The price they will charge per dinner is $(Round your answer to two decimal places.)(Hint: The demand curve in this case will have a kink in it at the price at which the senior demand is first positive so that the quantity they demand needs tobe added to the quantity the adults demand. The kink creates a jump in the marginal revenue curve at this quantity.)Suppose the managers do price discriminate.The price they will charge adults is $ per dinner, and the price they will charge seniors is $ per dinner. (Round your answer to two decimal places)The quantity of dinners they will sell to adults is and the quantity of dinners they will sell to seniors is 0Suppose there is no fixed cost.The restaurant's economic profit if the managers charge one price is $The restaurant's economic profit if the managers engage in price discrimination is $

Q=180-2P. he marginal cost of a dinner is constant at $20. uppose the managers do not price discriminate and there is no fixed cost. e price they will charge per dinner is $ (Round your answer to two decimal places.) dint: The demand curve in this case will have a kink in it at the price at which the senior demand is first positive so that the quantity they demand needs added to the quantity the adults demand. The kink creates a jump in the marginal revenue curve at this quantity.) uppose the managers do price discriminate. he price they will charge adults is $ he quantity of dinners they will sell to adults is uppose there is no fixed cost. he restaurant's economic profit if the managers charge one price is $ he restaurant's economic profit if the managers engage in price discrimination is t Cound your answers to two decimal places.) the managers want to price discriminate? per dinner, and the price they will charge seniors is $ per dinner. (Round your answer to two decimal places.) and the quantity of dinners they will sell to seniors is

Q=180-2P. he marginal cost of a dinner is constant at $20. uppose the managers do not price discriminate and there is no fixed cost. e price they will charge per dinner is $ (Round your answer to two decimal places.) dint: The demand curve in this case will have a kink in it at the price at which the senior demand is first positive so that the quantity they demand needs added to the quantity the adults demand. The kink creates a jump in the marginal revenue curve at this quantity.) uppose the managers do price discriminate. he price they will charge adults is $ he quantity of dinners they will sell to adults is uppose there is no fixed cost. he restaurant's economic profit if the managers charge one price is $ he restaurant's economic profit if the managers engage in price discrimination is t Cound your answers to two decimal places.) the managers want to price discriminate? per dinner, and the price they will charge seniors is $ per dinner. (Round your answer to two decimal places.) and the quantity of dinners they will sell to seniors is

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter12: The Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 12.14P

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