Quantity (in gallons) Total Price Revenue $8 $0 50 7 350 100 600 150 5 750 200 800 250 3 750 300 2 600 350 1 350 400 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk. Their respective dairies are equal in size. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce and what price to charge. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero and there are no fixed costs. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table above. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Maria and Miguel from operating as a cartel. Assuming that each producer can only modify quantity in increments of 50, which of the following is consistent with the Nash equilibrium for this scenario? Maria will charge a price of $5 for each gallon. Miguel and Maria will each sell 150 gallons per week. The Nash equilibrium quantity is 200. Milk will sell for $4 per gallon.

Quantity (in gallons) Total Price Revenue $8 $0 50 7 350 100 600 150 5 750 200 800 250 3 750 300 2 600 350 1 350 400 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk. Their respective dairies are equal in size. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce and what price to charge. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero and there are no fixed costs. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table above. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Maria and Miguel from operating as a cartel. Assuming that each producer can only modify quantity in increments of 50, which of the following is consistent with the Nash equilibrium for this scenario? Maria will charge a price of $5 for each gallon. Miguel and Maria will each sell 150 gallons per week. The Nash equilibrium quantity is 200. Milk will sell for $4 per gallon.

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Film A) is large and the other film (Film B) is small, as the prisoners dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. Assuming that both films know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?
Does each individual in a prisoners dilemma benefit more from cooperation or from pursuing self-interest? Explain briefly.
The Tampa Tribune and the St. Petersburg Times compete for readers in the Tampa Bay market for newspapers. Recently, both newspapers considered changing the prices they charge for their Sunday editions. Suppose they considered the following payoff table for making a simultaneous decision to charge either a low price of $0.50 or a high price of $1.00. Tampa’s profits are shown in regular type. St. Petersburg’s profits are shown in bold. 7. Which cell(s) is/are strategically stable?
5. The following problem was first considered by John von Neumann and is a fundamentalresult game theory.A and B play the following game:A writes down either number 1 or number 2, and B must guess which one.If the number that A has written down is i and B has guessed correctly, B receives i units from A.If B makes a wrong guess, B pays 4/5 of a unit to A.First we consider the expected gain of player B.Suppose B guesses 1 with probability p and 2 with probability 1 −p.Let X1 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 1.Let X2 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 2.(a) Find the pmf of X1 and X2(b) Find B’s expected gain for these two cases, E[X1] and E[X2].(c) What value of p maximizes the minimum possible value of B’s expected gain?Now consider the expected loss of player ASuppose that A writes down 1 with probability q and 2 with probability 1 −q.Let Y1 be A’s loss (or gain) if B chooses number 1.Let Y2 be A’s loss (or gain) if B…
13) Two identical firms are engaged in Cournot competition, with cost functionsTCA(QA) = 30 QA and TCB(QB) = 30 QB. The market demand is given by P = 480 –3Q.a) Plot the best response functions and report the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, price and profits.b) What are the prices, quantities, and profits for the firms if they decide to collude and share profits equally?c) Show that firms have an incentive the deviate from the collusive outcome.d) Find the Stackelberg equilibrium if A leads and B follows.e) Show the equilibria in the previous parts on the inverse demand function. Calculate and identify consumersurplus and deadweight loss in each equilibrium. If you can only answer a limited amount of questions, please answer d and e :)
1. Consider the pricing game between firm 1 (row) and firm 2 (column) belowwhere each number represents the profits made by each firm.:Table 1: Pricing gameLow HighLow 288,288 360,216High 216,360 324,324 a) Point out the Nash equilibrium. Is this a unique Nash equilibrium?c) What type of commitment can firm 1 make to improve its pay-off?Can it be classified as a threat or promise? (Assume that the commitmentis credible.)d) How would you represent the game as a game tree with the option tocommit?2. Consider the signalling / production game with the order of play given below.Assuming that the signal is informative (i.e. education is sufficiently costly),how would you change the order of the game to make sure that poolingequilibriums are ruled out? Verbally motivate your answer.• Nature chooses ability of the workers a ∈ (H, L), ability is observed byworkers but not employers.• The worker choose an education level s ∈ (0, 1).• The employer offer contracts w(s).• The worker accepts or…