Question 25. Suppose buyers of ice-cream are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Ice-cream sellers 1 and 2 simultaneously locate on the interval, each locating so to maximize her market share given the location of the rival. Each seller's market shar the proportion of buyers who are located closer to her location than (a) Both will locate at 1/2. (b) One will locate at 1/4 and the other at 3/4. (c) One will locate at 0 and the other at 1. (d) One will locate at 1/3 and the other at 2/3. corresponds to the rival's location. Question 26. In the context of previous question, suppose it is understood by all players that seller 3 will locate on [0, 1] after observing the simultaneous location choices of sellers 1 and 2. Seller 3 aims to maximize market share given the locations of 1 and 2. The locations of sellers 1 and 2 are as follows: (a) Both will locate at 1/2. (b) One will locate at 1/4 and the other at 3/4. (c) One will locate at 0 and the other at 1. (d) One will locate at 1/3 and the other at 2/3. edustre.in ; 9E

Question 25. Suppose buyers of ice-cream are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Ice-cream sellers 1 and 2 simultaneously locate on the interval, each locating so to maximize her market share given the location of the rival. Each seller's market shar the proportion of buyers who are located closer to her location than (a) Both will locate at 1/2. (b) One will locate at 1/4 and the other at 3/4. (c) One will locate at 0 and the other at 1. (d) One will locate at 1/3 and the other at 2/3. corresponds to the rival's location. Question 26. In the context of previous question, suppose it is understood by all players that seller 3 will locate on [0, 1] after observing the simultaneous location choices of sellers 1 and 2. Seller 3 aims to maximize market share given the locations of 1 and 2. The locations of sellers 1 and 2 are as follows: (a) Both will locate at 1/2. (b) One will locate at 1/4 and the other at 3/4. (c) One will locate at 0 and the other at 1. (d) One will locate at 1/3 and the other at 2/3. edustre.in ; 9E

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.1IP

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