For the 2 x 2 game, find the optimal strategy for each player. Be sure to check for saddle points before using the formulas. (: ) 6 -4 For row player R: r = r2 For column player C: C1 = C2 = Find the value v of the game for row player R. v = Who is the game favorable to? The game is favorable to the row player. The game is favorable to the column player. This is a fair game.
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- 5.Each of Player 1 and Player 2 chooses an integer from the set {1, 2, ..., K}. If they choose the same integer, P1 gets +1 and P2 gets -1; if they choose different integers, P1 gets -1 and P2 gets +1. (a) Show that it is a NE for each player to choose every integer in {1, 2, ..., K} with equal probability, K1 . (b) Show that there are no NE besides the one you found in (a).A new government lottery has been announced. Each person who buys a ticket submits an integer between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose submission is closest to four-fifths of the average of all submissions. If ties occur, the price will be shared. If Chloe expects other players to select numbers randomly, what number should she choose? Chloe should choose the number (a)_____ if you expect all other players to exhibit the same depth of reasoning as Chloe, what number would you choose? you should choose the number (b)______(Symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium) A profile α∗ of mixed strategies in a strategic game with vNM preferences in which each player has the same set of actions is a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if it is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and α∗ i is the same for every player i. Solve this problem: At a large round table sit n ≥ 2 players, each holding 3 cards: one white, one black, and one red. Each player must secretly choose one of their cards and then, when the bell rings, simultaneously reveal it publicly with all the others. If all players choose the white card, each of them receives 6 points. If player i chooses the white card, and at least one of the other players chooses a card of a different color, player i receives 1 point. If player i chooses the black card, they receive 3 points, regardless of the decisions of the other players. If player i chooses the red card, they receive 0 points, regardless of the decisions of the other players. Find all symmetric…
- * Please be advised this is for practice preperation only ** i just really need help on this - I dont undertsand X is an arbitrary number Suppose the stage game was played for 3 rounds. Consider the following strategy: Round 1: play C. Round 2: play C if both players played C in round 1. Otherwise, play E. Round 3: play D if both players played C in rounds 1 and 2. Otherwise, play E.Ignore discounting (that is, δ = 1). Suppose that both players pick the strategy above. What condition on x is needed to make this strategy profile a SPNE? Hint: remember to check for possible deviations separately for rounds 1 and 2.(a) 5 ≥ x(b) 7 ≥ x(c) 9 ≥ x(d) 11 ≥ x(e) 13 ≥ xThe mixed stratergy nash equalibrium consists of : the probability of firm A selecting October is 0.692 and probability of firm A selecting December is 0.309. The probability of firm B selecting October is 0.5 and probability of firm selecting December is 0.5. In the equilibrium you calculated above, what is the probability that both consoles are released in October? In December? What are the expected payoffs of firm A and of firm B in equilibrium?A clothing store and a jeweler are located side by side in a shopping mall. If the clothing store spend C dollars on advertising and the jeweler spends J dollars on advertising, then the profits of the clothing store will be (36 + J )C - 2C 2 and the profits of the jeweler will be (30 + C )J - 2J 2. The clothing store gets to choose its amount of advertising first, knowing that the jeweler will find out how much the clothing store advertised before deciding how much to spend. The amount spent by the clothing store will be Group of answer choices $17. $34. $51. $8.50. $25.50.
- Choose the correct answer. A strategy AA is "dominant" for a player X if: A. Every outcome under strategy AA generates positive payoffs. B. Irrespective of any of the possible strategies chosen by the other players, strategy AA generates a higher payoff than any other strategy available to player X. C. Strategy AA is the best response to every strategy of the other player. D. Strategy AA contains among its outcomes the highest possible payoff in the game. E. Strategy AA is the best response to the best strategy of the other player.Two players bargain over 1 unit of a divisible object. Bargaining starts with an offer of player 1, which player 2 either accepts or rejects. If player 2 rejects, then player 1 makes another offer; if player 2 rejects once more, then player 2 makes an offer. If player 1 rejects the offer of player 2, then once more it is the turn of player 1 where he makes two consecutive offers. As long as an agreement has not been reached this procedure continues. For example, suppose that agreement is reached at period 5, it follows that player 1 makes offers in period 1,2 then player 2 makes an o er in period 3, then player 1 makes offers in 4,5. Negotiations can continue indefinitely, agreement in period 't' with a division (x, 1- x) leads to payoffs ( , (1-x)).(The difference from Rubinstein's alternating offer bargaining is that player one makes two consecutive offers, whereas player 2 makes a single offer in her turn.) a. Show that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which player 2's…Normal Form: Which one of the following descriptions below is CORRECT according to this Normal Form shown? 1.) If Player 2 believes that Player 1 randomly choose H or L with same probability, then Player 2's expected for choosing HC is 2. 2.) If Player 1 has 20% chance to play H and 80% chance to play L, Player 2 has 40% chance to play HD and 60% chance to play LC; then Player 1's expected payoff is 2. 3.) If Player 2 randomly play one of its 4 strategies without any preference, then Player 1's expected payoff for playing L is 2.5. 4.) If Player 2 believes that Player 1 has no probability to play L, then Player 2 would prefer to choose HC or HD.
- Consider the charity auction. In many charity auctions, altruistic celebrities auction objects with special value for their fans to raise funds for charity. Madonna, for example, held an auction to sell clothing worn during her career and raised about 3.2 million dollars. In the charity auction the winner of the lot is the highest bidder. The difference with the standard auction is that all bidders are required to pay an amount equal to what they bid. Suppose there are two bidders and assume bidders have valuations randomly drawn from the interval [2, 4] according to the uniform distribution. 1. Derive the equilibrium bidding function. Hint: After getting the differential equation given by the FOC, propose a non-linear bidding function b(v) = α + βv2 as solution. Your task is to find α and β. 2. Derive the revenue of the seller in the charity auction. 3. Would the seller obtain higher profits if she organized a first-price sealed bid auction instead? A. Yes, higher revenue B. No, lower…Mohamed and Kate each pick an integer number between 1 and 3 (inclusive). They make their choices sequentially.Mohamed is the first player and Kate the second player. If they pick the same number each receives a payoff equal to the number they named. If they pick a different number, they get nothing. What is the SPE of the game? a. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate is indifferent between 1, 2 and 3. b. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2, and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. c. Mohamed chooses 1 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2 and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. d. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 3.Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?