None Question 6. Consider the following payoff matrix for a two player game:Player 2XYPlayer 1A4,33, 4B1, -1 0, 2Q6)a) Change one number in the payoff matrix in order to make (A, X) a Nash Equilibrium, and writethe new payoff matrix below:Player 2XYPlayer 1ABQ6) b) Change one different number in the original payoff matrix in order to make (A, X) a Nash Equi-librium, and write the new payoff matrix below:Player 1ABPlayer 2XY

Q6(a)Change one number in the payoff matrix to make (A, X) a Nash Equilibrium and write the new…

Answered: Question 6. Consider the following…

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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A and B are competitors in the mobile phone industry. Both A and B have to decide whether to participate or not to participate in a Phone for the Future Trade Fair next month. The matrix payoff below shows the profits (USD million) corresponding to their actions. a) What is the Nash equilibrium of the above game? b) Is the Nash equilibrium Pareto Optima? Explain. c) Suppose B is pessimistic of A's rationality, what is B's strategy? Compare and comment on B's strategy in (a) and (c). A Participate Do not participate B Participate Do not participate 400,1000 200,200 500,500 1000,400
Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Strategy X Y Player 1 A 30, 30 16, -50 B -50, 16 50, 50 A. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. check all that apply (16, −50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) (50, 50) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? multiple choice (16, −50) (50, 50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) B. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? multiple choice A or B What outcome do you think would occur as a result? multiple choice (−50, 16) (16, −50) (30, 30) (50, 50) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is…
D Question 11 Consider the following Extended Form Game: O 1 02 O 3 A' 04 (9,5) A P2 P1 B' A' (5,2) (8,5) B x A (1,6) P2 B' According to backwards induction, in how many turn does the game end? P1 B (6,7)
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