Regarding the merger in Q8:"Mike Coupe, the boss of Sainsbury’s, had claimed that prices would fall by as much as 10%."Which merger explanation can be behind such a fall in prices, if realized?a) Managerial theories of mergers.b) Economies of scale.c) Increased market power.d) Valuation discrepancy.e) Both economies of scale and increase in market power. 8In 2019, competition authorities threw out a merger ofAsda and Sainsbury's. What type of growth would themerger of Asda and Sainsbury's have represented?Horizontal expansionHorizontal integrationConglomerate merger00094Vertical integrationHorizontal allianceContinuing with the question above, if Sainsbury'sshareholders are concerned with managements'behaviour, which of the following options is LIKELY tohelp?Linking managers' salaries to the firm's growthrates.Providing stock options for the managers.Linking manager's salaries to the firm's revenue.Raising the manager's salaries.All of these will help.

When two companies come together into an agreement and form a new, single company, then it is said…

Regarding the merger in Q8: "Mike Coupe, the boss of Sainsbury’s, had claimed that prices would fall by as much as 10%." Which merger explanation can be behind such a fall in prices, if realized? a) Managerial theories of mergers. b) Economies of scale. c) Increased market power. d) Valuation discrepancy. e) Both economies of scale and increase in market power.

Regarding the merger in Q8: "Mike Coupe, the boss of Sainsbury’s, had claimed that prices would fall by as much as 10%." Which merger explanation can be behind such a fall in prices, if realized? a) Managerial theories of mergers. b) Economies of scale. c) Increased market power. d) Valuation discrepancy. e) Both economies of scale and increase in market power.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter16: Government Regulation

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

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