True/False 1. In the dominant rm model ( la Hotelling) an increase in the marginal cost of the dominant rm (with constant marginal costs) implies that pro ts necessarily decrease.
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True/False
1. In the dominant rm model ( la Hotelling) an increase in the marginal cost of the dominant rm (with constant marginal costs) implies that pro ts necessarily decrease.
2. Suppose that an industry has 10 rms where the market shares are ordered from the most to the least dominant rm f0:5;0:37;0:05;0:03;0:02;0:01;0:01;0:005;0:004;0:001g. The Her ndahl index is IH = 0:3.
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- The two major scooter companies in India, ABC and XYZ, are competing for a fixed market. If both manufacturers make major model changes in a year, then their percentage market share not change. Also, if they both do not make major model changes, their percentage market share remains constant. If ABC makes a major model change and XYZ does not, then ABC is able to take away a% of the market away from XYZ, and if XYZ makes a major model change ABC does not, XYZ is able to take away b% of the market away from ABC. Express this as a 2 x 2 game and solve for the optimal strategy for each of the companies.Questions: A) How much less do each of these firms earn in the Nash equilibrium than if they jointly maximize profits? Please provide me with the correct answer, complete with a detailed explanation and calculations; otherwise, I will give multiple downvotes.Please avoid using ChatGPT and refrain from providing handwritten solutions; otherwise, I will definitely give a downvote. Also, be mindful of plagiarism. Answer completely and accurate answer. Rest assured, you will receive an upvote if the answer is accurate.Please no written by hand 1. Suppose the automobile manufacturing industry has two firms, General Motors and Ford. Assume that the market demand function is Q = 1,000 − p, and each firm’s marginal cost and average cost are $40. a. What is the marginal revenue for General Motors? Assume, ??? represent residual demand for General Motors and ?? represents residual demand for Ford. b. What is the best response function for General Motors and Ford? c. What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in this market? d. Graph the best response curves for both General Motors and Ford, placing the quantity produced by General Motors (???) in the x-axis. Label intercepts and Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
- 2. Consider a two-firms Cournot model with constant returns to scale. Assume also that the inverse demand function is P = 100 – 2Q, with marginal cost equal to 20for both firms, where Q = q1 + q2 . a) Derive the Nash equilibrium of this model and compare it with Monopoly and Perfect competition.3 Consider the Dixit capacity investment model when the inverse market demand curve is P(Q) = 200 − Q, w = 20, r = 10, and K = 200. a. Derive a new firm’s post-entry best reply function. b. Given initial capacity of x, derive the incumbent firm’s post-entry best reply function. c. Given x, derive the post-entry equilibrium profit of a new firm. d. Derive the minimum capacity that makes entry unprofitable. e. Derive the optimal capacity choice of the incumbent firm.. (Requires calculus). In the model of a dominant firm, assume that the fringe supply curve is given by Q = -1 + 0.2P, where P is market price and Q is output. Demand is given by Q = 11 – P.What will price and output be if there is no dominant firm? Now assume that there is a dominant firm, whose marginal cost is constant at $6. Derive the residual demand curve that it faces and calculate its profit-maximizing output and price. highest bidder, but both the winning and losing bidders must pay her their bids. So if Jones bids $1 they pay a total of $3, but Jones gets the money, leaving him with a net gain of $98 and Smith with -$1. If both bid the same amount, the $100 is split evenly between them. Assume that each of them has only two $1 bills on hand, leaving three possible bids: $0, $1 or $2. Write out the payoff matrix for this game, and then find its Nash equilibrium.
- You are the manager in a market composed of 20 firms, each of which has a 5.00 percent market share. In addition, each firm has a strong financial position and is located within a 100-mile radius of its competitors. a. Calculate the premerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for this market? b. Suppose that any two of these firms merge. What is the postmerger HHI? c. Based only on the information contained in this question and on the U.S. Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines described in this chapter, do you think the Justice Department would attempt to block a merger between any two of the firms?multiple choice It may but will also consider other factors. It likely will not. It likely will.A company, say Afghan Saffron, is considering entering the Iranian’s market which is dominated by its principal rival, say Iranian Saffron. Clearly, Afghan Exporters decision to enter or not will be judged on the potential profitability of such a move. This, in turn, depends upon the way Iranian will react to such a business move by Afghan Exporters. If Iranian reacts aggressively by launching a big commercial campaign, then an entry by Afghan Saffron Exporters will result to a loss of $2.8 million for Afghan Saffron Exporters and a loss of $2.2 million for Iranian Manufacturers. If, on the other hand, Iranian accommodates Afghan Saffron exporter’s entry, then both Afghan and Iranian will be making profits of $1 million and $1 million, respectively. Finally, if Afghan Exporter does not enter the market at all, then Iranians will be making monopoly profits of $3.5 million”. Requirements: a) What would you do if you were the CEO of Afghan Saffron Exporter and Why, Explain briefly-use any…The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. (a) At the initial equilibrium, what is total surplus (consumer surplus plus producer surplus)? Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price? (c) The output? (d) Total profit? (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a…
- The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price?The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a monopoly?The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (c) The output? (d) Total profit?