rve Game g art Long 0,1 1,0 Player 2 Short 1,0 0,1 to the figure above. The one-period Nash equil ort; Player 2: Short. ng; Player 2: Short. ort; Player 2: Long. mg; Player 2: Long. bove, since there is no pure strategy Nash equi to the figure above. The mixed strategy equili

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.7P
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Player 1
Here is a stylized game of serving in tennis. Player 1 has a choice of serving short or long when
it is her turn to serve. Player 2 has a choice of preparing for a short or long serve. To focus on the
choice of serve, we will assume that a player who does not prepare loses the point.
The Tennis Serve Game
Player 2
Short
Long
0,1
Short
0,1
13. Refer to the figure above. The one-period Nash equilibrium
A. Player 1: Short; Player 2: Short.
B. Player 1: Long; Player 2: Short.
C. Player 1: Short; Player 2: Long.
D. Player 1: Long; Player 2: Long.
E. none of the above, since there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this game.
14. Refer to the figure above. The mixed strategy equilibrium for each player is to:
A. choose Long with probability two thirds, choose Short with probability one third.
B. choose Long with probability one half, choose Short with probability one half.
C. choose Long with probability one quarter, choose Short with probability three quarters
D. choose Long with probability one third, choose Short with probability two thirds.
E. none of the above, since there is no mixed strategy equilibrium for this game.
Transcribed Image Text:Player 1 Here is a stylized game of serving in tennis. Player 1 has a choice of serving short or long when it is her turn to serve. Player 2 has a choice of preparing for a short or long serve. To focus on the choice of serve, we will assume that a player who does not prepare loses the point. The Tennis Serve Game Player 2 Short Long 0,1 Short 0,1 13. Refer to the figure above. The one-period Nash equilibrium A. Player 1: Short; Player 2: Short. B. Player 1: Long; Player 2: Short. C. Player 1: Short; Player 2: Long. D. Player 1: Long; Player 2: Long. E. none of the above, since there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. 14. Refer to the figure above. The mixed strategy equilibrium for each player is to: A. choose Long with probability two thirds, choose Short with probability one third. B. choose Long with probability one half, choose Short with probability one half. C. choose Long with probability one quarter, choose Short with probability three quarters D. choose Long with probability one third, choose Short with probability two thirds. E. none of the above, since there is no mixed strategy equilibrium for this game.
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