Suppose a monopolist faces consumer demand given by P=400 - 20 with a constant marginal cost of $40 per unit (where marginal cost equals average total cost assume the ferm has no fed costa). If the monopoly can only charge a single price, then it will eam profits of SEnter your response rounded as a whole number) Corespondingly, consumer surplus is $ However, f the fem were to practice price discrimination such that consumer surplus becomes profit then, holding output constant at 90, the monopoly would have profits of $

Suppose a monopolist faces consumer demand given by P=400 - 20 with a constant marginal cost of $40 per unit (where marginal cost equals average total cost assume the ferm has no fed costa). If the monopoly can only charge a single price, then it will eam profits of SEnter your response rounded as a whole number) Corespondingly, consumer surplus is $ However, f the fem were to practice price discrimination such that consumer surplus becomes profit then, holding output constant at 90, the monopoly would have profits of $

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter8: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7SQP

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