Suppose that every driver faces a 4% probability of an automoblle accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $9,000. Suppose there are two types of Individuals: those with $72,000.00 In the bank and those with $2,250.00 In the bank. Assume that Individuals with $2,250.00 In the bank declare bankruptcy If they get in an acident. In bankruptcy, creditors recelve only what Individuals have In the bank. Assume that both types of Individuals are only slightly risk averse. In this scenario, the actuarially fair price of full Insurance, In which all damages are pald by the Insurance company, Is Assume that the price of Insurance Is set at the actuarially fair price. At this price, drivers with $72,000.00 in the bank likely buy Insurance, and those with $2,250.00 In the bank likely v buy Insurance. (Hint: For each type of dnver, compare the price of Insurance to the expected cost without Insurance.) Suppose a state law has been passed forcing all individuals to purchase Insurance at the actuarlally falr price. True or False: The law will affect the behavlor of both types of drivers. O True O False

Suppose that every driver faces a 4% probability of an automoblle accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $9,000. Suppose there are two types of Individuals: those with $72,000.00 In the bank and those with $2,250.00 In the bank. Assume that Individuals with $2,250.00 In the bank declare bankruptcy If they get in an acident. In bankruptcy, creditors recelve only what Individuals have In the bank. Assume that both types of Individuals are only slightly risk averse. In this scenario, the actuarially fair price of full Insurance, In which all damages are pald by the Insurance company, Is Assume that the price of Insurance Is set at the actuarially fair price. At this price, drivers with $72,000.00 in the bank likely buy Insurance, and those with $2,250.00 In the bank likely v buy Insurance. (Hint: For each type of dnver, compare the price of Insurance to the expected cost without Insurance.) Suppose a state law has been passed forcing all individuals to purchase Insurance at the actuarlally falr price. True or False: The law will affect the behavlor of both types of drivers. O True O False

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.5P

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