Two firms sell a standardized product in a Cournot oligopoly. The inverse demand for the market is P = 580 – 3Q where Q = (Q1 + Q2). The cost functions are C1(Q1) = 4Q1 and C2(Q2) = 4Q2. What is the optimal output level for firm 1?

Two firms sell a standardized product in a Cournot oligopoly. The inverse demand for the market is P = 580 – 3Q where Q = (Q1 + Q2). The cost functions are C1(Q1) = 4Q1 and C2(Q2) = 4Q2. What is the optimal output level for firm 1?

Economics For Today

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Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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Two firms sell a standardized product in a Cournot oligopoly. The inverse demand for the market is P = 580 – 3Q where Q = (Q₁ + Q₂). The cost functions are C₁(Q₁) = 4Q₁ and C₂(Q₂) = 4Q₂. What is the optimal output level for firm 1?

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