Voters arrive at a social ranking of alternatives by consulting a "holy book": the social ranking is the ranking found in this book. Which of the Arrow's axioms defining an attractive preference aggregation method is violated by this method? (a) Non-dictatorship (b) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (c) The Pareto principle (d) Unrestricted domain

Voters arrive at a social ranking of alternatives by consulting a "holy book": the social ranking is the ranking found in this book. Which of the Arrow's axioms defining an attractive preference aggregation method is violated by this method? (a) Non-dictatorship (b) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (c) The Pareto principle (d) Unrestricted domain

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.2IP

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Arrow's impossibility theorem states that under certain assumptions about preferences, no voting system exists that satisfies all of the following properties: • Unanimity • Transitivity • Independence of irrelevant alternatives • No dictators
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