Which of the following are possible reasons why empirical studies do not always find evidence for adverse selection in the real world? (please choose all that apply) Insurees with higher cognitive ability (though low-risk) were more likely to purchase supplemental insurance Insurers can accurately predict customers risk Insurees misperceive their risk Risk aversion overcomes adverse selection on health risks

Which of the following are possible reasons why empirical studies do not always find evidence for adverse selection in the real world? (please choose all that apply) Insurees with higher cognitive ability (though low-risk) were more likely to purchase supplemental insurance Insurers can accurately predict customers risk Insurees misperceive their risk Risk aversion overcomes adverse selection on health risks

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter4: Economic Evaluation In Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3QAP

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Which of the following statements is FALSE regarding the concept of "adverse selection"? Multiple Choice Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss. Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers. To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.
Multiple Choice Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss. Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers. To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.
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