Which of the following is a significant difference in the outcomes between the dictator game and the ultimatum game? Multiple Choice O Self-interest is revealed more strongly in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game. The ultimatum game tends to result in a more even split of the money. There is little difference, as fairness considerations lead to similar splits of the money in both games. The dictator game tends to result in a more even split of the money.

Which of the following is a significant difference in the outcomes between the dictator game and the ultimatum game? Multiple Choice O Self-interest is revealed more strongly in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game. The ultimatum game tends to result in a more even split of the money. There is little difference, as fairness considerations lead to similar splits of the money in both games. The dictator game tends to result in a more even split of the money.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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