Your company is competing in a sealed-bid auction for a package of items your company values at $30,000. You expect the bids to be uniformly distributed between $20,000 and $30,000. a. Fill in the following table Bid Profit P(Win) Competitors = 2 E(Profit) Competitors = 2 P(Win) Competitors = 3 E(Profit) Competitors = 3 $20,000 $22,000 $24,000 $26,000 $28,000 $30,000 b. If there are two competitors, what is the optimal bid? c. If there are three competitors, what is the optimal bid?

Your company is competing in a sealed-bid auction for a package of items your company values at $30,000. You expect the bids to be uniformly distributed between $20,000 and $30,000. a. Fill in the following table Bid Profit P(Win) Competitors = 2 E(Profit) Competitors = 2 P(Win) Competitors = 3 E(Profit) Competitors = 3 $20,000 $22,000 $24,000 $26,000 $28,000 $30,000 b. If there are two competitors, what is the optimal bid? c. If there are three competitors, what is the optimal bid?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5MC

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In a sealed-bid first price auction, if you notice that your competition is stronger, you should a. Shade your bid more b. Shade your bid less c. Bid more aggressively d. Both B&C Don't use chat gpt if you use i downvote your answer and if you don't use then is give you upvote and i required only typed answer
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A occurs if all players in a game play their best strategies given what their competitors do.
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