Special Air Service

The Siege of the Iranian Embassy On April 30th 1980 a six man Iraqi terrorist group burst into the Iranian embassy. The embassy in Princes Gate, London, contained 20 people, which included a police constable. The terrorist wanted the release of 91 political prisoners from jail in Iran and a plane for them to escape. If their demands were not met they would execute all the hostages and blow up the Embassy. The Metropolitan Police invited B Squadron, 22 SAS onto the scene

said that the operation’s plan “didn’t survive first contact with the enemy.” Although Operation Anaconda was successful, with its rapid planning, lack of a unified command with an established joint force command structure over the prepositioning of air assets, ground assets, and SOF assets early in the fight it led to an ill-prepared wartime fighting

scramble to coordinate and rush reinforcements into battle after the shooting begun. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain headquarters failure to establish and maintain tactical control, operational control, or situational awareness (SA) of special operations forces and other inter-agencies led to unity of command confusion during the execution of Operation Anaconda. Command Structure before Operation Anaconda The United States and its allies responded against Al Qaida members and their Taliban

Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations

successful, led to the death of U.S. service members. Joint planning for Operation Anaconda, with its complex variables requiring integrated skills, failed to account for enemy variables, withheld information from support elements, and failed to establish effective command and control. Enemy Initial planning to execute Operation Anaconda was to employ the ?hammer and anvil? technique. This technique uses a primary assault force,

reliable intelligence. Due to the lack of intelligence regarding the enemy and their weapons there was not a unity of command and instead it was multi headed by General Hagenbeck and Task Force Mountain headquarters but did not include command of the air forces or the friendly Afghan units that were to be used as the main axis of attack in the battle plan. Though the battle was not carried out as planned

Operation Anaconda: Questionable Joint Planning Success Operation Anaconda, although a win for the US and Coalition Forces, was seen by many as a joint planning nightmare. Throughout history, the military has closely examined engagements through case studies to improve the planning process. Operation Anaconda’s case studies displayed mistakes, power struggles, and lack of credible Intel while planning the execution of Operation Anaconda causing question about the success of the operation. Mistakes

would have shattered the enemy’s ability to conduct major combat operations and set the conditions for stability operations to take place. Operation Anaconda was a joint effort between elements of the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces from multiple nations, and local Afghan fighters to drive out al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from the Shahikot Valley in order to set the conditions for successful stability operations in Afghanistan. The battle took place in late

two subordinate commands. Those commands were Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFLCC and CFACC were both staged in the Persian Gulf and were set to offer support to any operation in Afghanistan from there. Task Force (TF) Dagger was the only ground force located in Afghanistan. (TF) Dagger consisted of 5th Special Operation Forces (SOF) and Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) operations. During the build-up and planning of Operation

forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander