failure in software
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Dec 6, 2023
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Software Failures and Professional Responsibility
In March 2014, Japanese auto manufacturing company Nissan recalled 99000 cars. The
reason of this recall was a software malfunction that disabled the deployment of airbags in
several popular Nissan models released from 2013 to 2014. Majority of the recalled vehicles
included popular models including Altima, Leaf, Sentra, and Pathfinder. This issue was
specifically in the “
occupant classification system” (OCS) (Jensen, 2014). The purpose of this
system and its software is to determine if a passenger is occupying the seat.
“Passenger seat
occupant detection systems provide two benefits. First, they ensure that the passenger air bag is
deployed for the proper-size occupant. Second, they disable the passenger air bag if no one is
occupying that seat” (Pattengale, 2007). The flaw was software liable for the detection of the
person sitting in the seat. Some of the situations causing this glitch was when the engine
vibration was too much disabling the software from distinguishing the object on seat properly.
This caused the sensors to push incorrect weight readings to the software and then leads the
software into deciding to not deploy the airbags. Different weight inputs to software may also
lead to deploying the airbag when a child is in crash. This may be dangerous in some instances
when the force of the airbag may be a greater danger than the impact dorm the car crash itself to
the child. Although faulty software is the main culprit in the recall of the vehicles by Nissan.
Software testing and Quality assurance may have also been partly at fault.
The situation may have been avoided if there was further testing with the airbags and
seats. Some of the key Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice (SECPP)
were not followed. The engineers at Nissan failed to follow four main SECPP principles. One of
them was Public. The main point violated from this principle was
1.03- “Approve software only
if they have a well-founded belief that it is safe, meets specifications, passes appropriate tests,
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and does not diminish quality of life, diminish privacy or harm the environment. The ultimate
effect of the work should be to the public good” (Software Engineering Code, 2017).
The
software that Nissan put in the vehicles put the consumers in significant anger. Consequences
from accidents without proper protection could range from severe long-term damage to motility.
Most importantly it also put a million consumers of Nissan in paranoia of the airbag
malfunctioning. The second principle violated was Product. The software that Nissan software
engineers provided did not meet the highest professional standards possible. Yet the software
made it through the production line and onto the consumers. As one of the points of the Product
principle 3.01 mentions “Strive for high quality, acceptable cost and a reasonable schedule,
ensuring significant tradeoffs are clear” (Software Engineering Code, 2017). This Principle was
not followed by Nissan. The cars with the air bag defected were the low-price range models and
to cut cost and reduce production time; Nissan used the same defective hardware and software
across the models affected, without considering the development of separate hardware for each
model.
Having separate hardware for the different design of seats the car models; could have
allowed Nissan to discover the flaw earlier. Another point of the product principle not followed
by Nissan was 3.07- “Strive to fully understand the specifications for software on which they
work” (Software Engineering Code, 2017). One of the problems for the sensors outputting wrong
data to the software was vibration due to road surfaces. The engineers at Nissan did not take all
scenarios into consideration. All though they knew of the specifications of what the sensors and
hardware needed to do; there will always be variables which will be left undiscovered. However,
this is not a valid excuse for one of the biggest car manufacturers in the world. The last point of
Product principle not followed was 3.10- “Ensure adequate testing, debugging, and review of
software and related documents on which they work” (Software Engineering Code, 2017). The
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software was debugged and reviewed by Nissan but it was not tested to the highest standard;
thorough testing of software and sensors should have been done. Another principle violated by
Nissan was Management. Point 5.02- “Ensure that software engineers are informed of standards
before being held to them” (Software Engineering Code, 2017) was violated by the company.
Although Nissan is very consistent with the vehicles they produced; the safety feature is not
consistent across all vehicles produce. Some of the entry level models do not come with any
safety features at all. In US all Nissan vehicles come with 10 airbags however the competing
model in Mexico produced by Nissan come with no air bags at all (Rose, 2016). This is to keep
the prices low and production feasible for the price point. This is a Direct decision of the Nissan
management. In this situation the consumers may hold the Nissan engineers accountable for the
failures of testing, however decision of the management to include some feature or the quality of
the product delivered is directly the output of the management. The last principle violated by
Nissan is Profession. The Profession principle says, “Software engineers shall advance the
integrity and reputation of the profession consistent with the public interest” (Software
Engineering Code, 2017). Although Nissan took actions to prevent accidents from occurring by
recalling the vehicles and providing software updates for free; there was no consistency. Nissan
Engineers violated on the important points of the Profession principle. As point 6.08 says “Take
responsibility for detecting, correcting, and reporting errors in software and associated
documents on which they work” (Software Engineering Code, 2017). Although Nissan took short
term action to mitigate the problem; it was not a solution for long term. In 2016 another recall of
3.2 million vehicles was made. This time it was the passenger- side airbags (Mays, 2016).
Nissan engineers were not consistent with the fix of the problem occurred in 2014. They did not
fully correct the problem and lost the integrity of the product and service they deliver.
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