LS 145 Disc_Week 10_Handout_Solved (1)

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LS 145 Discussion Section, Fall 2023, Week 10 Quizzes 12, 13 Review GSI: Cristina Violante 1 Default Rules Consider the following scenario: Andrea wants to buy Bethany’s used laptop, but there is a risk that it could be defective. A would like for B to issue a warranty. B is hesitant to bring the question of a warranty into the negotiation. Negotiating a warranty will cost the parties $20 in transaction costs. Should the laptop be defective, the dispute will cost $400 to fix. The probability of a defect is 3% . 1. Does it pay for Andrea to ask Bethany for a warranty? No. The expected monetary loss ($12) is less than the transaction costs that would be required to negotiate the warranty ($20). We know that the expected monetary loss is $12 because: EML = p 1 O 1 (+ p 2 O 2 + p 3 O 3 + p 4 O 4 … ) EML = .03 * $400 EML = $12 2. If the transaction costs were only $10, would it pay off to deliberately leave a gap in the contract? No, now it no longer makes sense to leave a gap in the contract, because the transaction costs to negotiate the warranty are less than the expected monetary loss (EML is still $12). The parties should determine this term of the contract ex ante . Remember, when determining whether to leave a gap in the contract, refer to this rule: If allocating a risk > allocating a loss * its probability (EMV), then leave the contractual gap. If allocating a risk ≤ allocating a loss * its probability (EMV), then fill the contractual gap. 3. If the probability of a defect is 5%, as opposed to 3%, does it pay for A to ask for a warranty? Yes, Andrea should ask for a warranty. EML is now $20 (.05 * $400). As long as transaction costs are less than or equal to $20, it is worth filling this contractual gap and getting the warranty.
LS 145 Discussion Section, Fall 2023, Week 10 Quizzes 12, 13 Review GSI: Cristina Violante 2 Now, further assume that: Andrea would be willing to pay up to $75 for Bethany’s warranty. Bethany would sell the warranty to Andrea for at least $25. The law has a default rule of caveat emptor, or “as is,” so, without the warranty, Bethany is not liable if there is a defect. 4. If transaction costs are still $20, does it pay to negotiate the allocation of the loss (i.e., to “contract around” the default “as is” rule through the use of a warranty)? Yes, even with $20 in transaction costs, the parties save $50 in risk bearing costs ($75-$25) through negotiating the allocation of the loss in advance. 5. What is the net surplus value generated by the warranty agreement between A and B? The parties save $50 in risk bearing costs (A’s risk premium – B’s risk premium = $75 – $25 = $50). Net surplus = Value generated – Transaction costs Net surplus = $50 – $20 Net surplus = $30 6. What if the default rule was latent defect, instead of “as is?” Would any surplus value be generated, and, if so, how much? Yes, surplus value would be generated. Because the default rule is latent defect, the liability now lies with the superior risk bearer, Bethany, instead of with the inferior risk bearer, Andrea. The parties no longer have to negotiate the allocation of the risk in advance, so they save the transaction costs required to do so ($20). Now, continue to assume a latent defect rule, but also assume that transaction costs are now zero. Per the latent defect rule, B will have to pay damages to A if the laptop contains a defect that could not have been discovered by a reasonably thorough inspection before the sale. 7. By how much would Bethany have to reduce the price of the laptop so that Andrea would sign a release to free Bethany from liability for defects? We learned above that A’s risk premium is $75, because that is how much that A was willing to pay for a warranty from B when the default rule was “as is.” This means that Andrea is indifferent between (1) losing $75 and not bearing the risk, and (2) having $75 and bearing the risk. Now that the default rule is the opposite (“latent defect” instead of “as is”), we can say that Andrea would require at least $75 to bear the risk associated with the laptop. Before, she was
LS 145 Discussion Section, Fall 2023, Week 10 Quizzes 12, 13 Review GSI: Cristina Violante 3 willing to pay up to $75 to get rid of the risk, so now she would need at least $75 to be incentivized to bear it. Bethany needs to reduce the price of the laptop by $75 to get Andrea to sign the release. 8. What is the maximum discount that Bethany is willing to give to incentivize Andrea to sign the release? We learned above that Bethany’s risk premium is $25. This means that she is indifferent between (1) receiving $25 and bearing the risk, and (2) not receiving $25 and not bearing the risk. When the default rule was “as is,” this meant that Bethany was willing to bear the risk for at least $25. Now that the default rule is the opposite, “latent defect,” Bethany will not offer anything more than $25 to incentivize Andrea to release her from liability. The maximum discount B will offer is $25. 9. Will the parties be able to negotiate a signing of the release? No. Andrea needs a discount of at least $75 to be incentivized to sign, but Bethany is only willing to offer a discount of up to $25.
LS 145 Discussion Section, Fall 2023, Week 10 Quizzes 12, 13 Review GSI: Cristina Violante 4 Remedies – Seller’s Breach Remember the following three kinds of damages: Expectation damages Leaves injured party indifferent between performance and breach Actual loss + expected profit Reliance damages Leaves injured party indifferent between no contract and breach Actual loss Opportunity costs damages Leave injured party indifferent between breach and performance of the best alternative contract Actual loss + expected profit under the second-best alternative contract Consider the following scenario: Jane promises to sell a table to Stacy for $25, to be paid upon delivery. In anticipation of having Jane’s table, Stacy contracts to refurbish the table and then sell it to Derek for $30. Jane breaches. To avoid defaulting on the contract with Derek, Stacy buys a different table for $35 to refurbish. Stacy sues Jane. 1. What are Stacy’s expected profits? $30 - $25 = $5 in expected profit 2. What are Stacy’s actual losses? $35 for different table - $30 for refurbished table = $5 3. What are Stacy’s expectation damages? Expectation damages = Actual loss + Expected profit Expectation damages = $5 + $5 Expectation damages = $10 4. What are Stacy’s reliance damages? Reliance damages = Actual loss = $5
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