PHIL_2501_Test_2_-_Sample_Questions
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School
Carleton University *
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Course
2501
Subject
Philosophy
Date
Feb 20, 2024
Type
Pages
6
Uploaded by samsungcorpy
1.
What theoretical advantages does philosophical behaviourism offer over dualism? What
are some problems with the view?
Advantages of Philosophical Behaviourism over Dualism
:
Philosophical behaviourism offers several advantages in the realm of understanding the mind. Firstly,
it simplifies the model for comprehending the mind by focusing on observable behaviours, avoiding
the need to introduce non-physical entities like the mind or soul, as dualism does. This simplicity is
appealing as it prevents the postulation of separate realms of reality for the mental and the physical.
Additionally, behaviourism aligns well with an empirical and scientific approach, emphasising the
importance of observable and measurable aspects of behaviour, which makes it more amenable to
scientific investigation compared to dualism. A significant advantage of philosophical behaviourism is
its ability to avoid the "interaction problem" that dualism faces, as it avoids the need to explain the
interaction between the non-physical mind and the physical body by concentrating on observable
behaviours and their determinants.
Problems with Philosophical Behaviourism:
Philosophical behaviourism faces several issues. Firstly, it has an exclusive focus on external,
observable behaviours, which leads to the neglect of internal mental states like thoughts, emotions,
and conscious experiences. These inner aspects of the mind are essential for comprehending the
richness of human mental life, but behaviourism falls short in effectively explaining or describing
them. Additionally, while behaviourism offers valuable insights into certain aspects of mental
functioning, it lacks the capacity to offer a comprehensive explanation of all mental phenomena. It
struggles to fully explain the complexity and depth of human mental experiences, especially those that
cannot be directly observed through external behaviours. Furthermore, behaviourism often disregards
critical internal cognitive processes occurring within the mind, such as reasoning, problem-solving,
memory, and perception, which play a significant role in our understanding of the mind and are not
adequately addressed by this perspective.
2.
What theoretical advantages does identity theory possess over philosophical
behaviourism? What is a problem for the view?
Identity theory and philosophical behaviourism are two different approaches to understanding the
relationship between mental states and physical states. It excels in offering causal explanations for the
relationship between mental states and behaviour, providing a direct link between specific mental
states and their corresponding brain states. This enables a clear understanding of how mental states
can cause behaviour, a feature that Behaviorism often struggles with. Moreover, Identity Theory
supports the notion of "mental causation," allowing our thoughts and feelings to genuinely influence
our behaviour, while Behaviorism may have difficulty explaining the causal efficacy of mental states.
Identity Theory also accommodates the existence of unobservable mental occurrences, such as
thoughts and emotions, which may not always manifest as observable behaviour. Unlike Behaviorism,
Identity Theory is primarily concerned with the physical basis of mental states and their relation to
behaviour, rather than analysing word meanings.
Identity Theory faces several challenges, including "species chauvinism," where it struggles to explain
how different creatures or systems can share identical mental states despite varying brain structures.
The "explanatory gap" poses difficulties in bridging the divide between physical brain descriptions
and the subjective, qualitative nature of mental states. The "problem of multiple realizability"
questions its ability to account for the same mental state being realised by diverse brain
configurations. Additionally, there's a need to clarify whether Identity Theory supports token or type
identity, and it grapples with the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity. Lastly, its
contingent identity claims raise concerns about the stability and reliability of such claims.
3.
In what ways does functionalism offer "the best of both worlds" in comparison to
philosophical behaviourism and identity theory?
Functionalism offers a balanced perspective that bridges the strengths of philosophical behaviourism
and identity theory. Like behaviourism, it values observable behaviours and internal cognitive
processes in understanding the mind, giving a more comprehensive view of mental phenomena. While
identity theory says one mental state matches one physical state, functionalism says one mental state
can show up in various physical ways, which helps understand the many facets of the human mind.
Furthermore, functionalism is comprehensive, examining both the functional roles and behavioural
aspects of mental states, along with their underlying physical processes.
Taking this comprehensive approach is especially helpful in grasping the complexities of how our
minds work and addresses the challenge of multiple realizability. In simple terms, functionalism finds
a middle ground between behaviourism, which focuses on what we can see, and identity theory, which
sticks to strict physical connections. This makes it a versatile and all-encompassing way to study the
mind.
4.
How does functionalism propose to analyse mental states? Explain in precise terms the
two main objections to functionalism we discussed in class: (i) Fodor's problem of
qualitative content, and (ii) Block's homunculi-headed robots.
Functionalism analyses mental states by focusing on their roles and function in the mind. However,
there are two main objections discussed in class:
(i) Fodor's Problem of Qualitative Content: Fodor's objection revolves around the issue of qualitative
content in conscious experiences. Functionalism emphasises the functional role of mental states,
which means it focuses on how mental states interact with each other and with external stimuli to
produce behaviour. However, Fodor points out that functional descriptions alone may not capture the
subjective and qualitative aspects of mental experiences, often referred to as "qualia." Qualia are the
unique, personal qualities of our experiences, such as the specific sensation of tasting chocolate or the
ineffable beauty of a sunset. Functionalism struggles to account for the rich and subjective nature of
these qualitative experiences. This objection highlights a potential gap in functionalism's ability to
fully explain what it's like to have particular mental states and why some mental states feel the way
they do.
(ii) Block's Homunculi-Headed Robots: Block's objection challenges functionalism by presenting
scenarios where systems meet the criteria for having mental states according to functional analysis but
may not truly possess consciousness. The classic example is the "homunculi-headed robot" thought
experiment. Imagine a robot with tiny humanoid figures or "homunculi" inside its head, each
performing specific tasks that collectively mimic mental processes. While this system might exhibit
the functional organisation associated with mental states, it's unclear whether the homunculi
themselves are conscious or if the robot as a whole genuinely possesses consciousness. Block's
argument highlights a potential issue with functionalism's attribution of mental states. It raises
concerns about whether functional organisation alone is sufficient for genuine consciousness, or if
there might be a need for some form of internal subjective experience. This objection challenges the
reliability of functionalism in determining which systems are truly conscious and which are not, as it
raises questions about the nature of consciousness and the potential for "hidden observers" within
functional systems.
5.
Explain Smart’s identity theory (including what specific type of identity he takes to be
centrally involved). What is his response to Objections 1 and 3? (Be sure to also explain
the objections.)
Smart's Identity Theory claims that each mental state corresponds to a specific pattern of neural
activity in the brain. In other words, mental states are identical to particular physical states in the
brain. Smart's theory focuses on "contingent identity," which means that it can be empirically verified
through observation and scientific investigation. This view is a type of physicalism, as it claims that
mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to physical processes.
Objection 1: This objection raises the concern that if we don't fully understand the inner workings of
the brain, how can we confidently claim that mental states are identical to specific brain processes? It
suggests that our ability to talk about sensations may not necessarily mean we are referring to
underlying brain processes.
Smart’s Reply to Objection 1: Smart argues that the lack of complete understanding of the brain's
inner workings doesn't undermine the theory's validity. He maintains that even if we discuss
sensations without comprehensive knowledge of brain processes, it doesn't necessarily mean that
sensations and brain processes are entirely different things. The identity theory proposes that as our
understanding of the brain advances, we will discover specific neural states that correspond to each
mental state.
Objection 3: This objection questions whether mental sensations have unique, indivisible qualities that
cannot be reduced to physical brain processes. It suggests that there might be subjective, qualitative
aspects of consciousness that are not accounted for by the theory.
Smart’s Reply to Objection 3: Smart's response to this objection involves using "topic-neutral"
language. He suggests that when discussing sensations, we should use language that doesn't involve
clear mentions to consciousness or subjective experiences. By doing so, he aims to avoid asserting
that sensations possess unique mental properties that are separate from brain processes. Smart's
approach involves redefining and rephrasing our descriptions of mental states, focusing on the
observable and objective aspects of those states, which can be more readily connected to neural
processes. This way, he maintains that we can bridge the gap between subjective experiences and
physical brain states, ultimately supporting his identity theory.
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