Operation Anaconda Case Study When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties. In February 2002, Special Forces intelligence agents along with Advanced Force Operations (AFO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were starting to make a connection between an increase presence of high-value targets (HVT), the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters in an area called Shahi-Kot Valley (Neville, 2005). Shahi-Kot is located in Afghanistan, just southeast of a town called Zormat. A plan was devised to eliminate the enemy threat in that area. Major Franklin L. Hagenbeck was to command the mission called Operation Anaconda. This operation was the first large-scale battle in the United States War in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora (Call, 2007, p. 57-86). Operation Anaconda was also unique in the fact that it would involve a great number of Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special Operations, and conventional forces (U.S. Army, n.d.),
The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).
At the beginning of the war the Union thought it would be an easy, quick war. The Union leaders at this time had no actual plan for the war. General Scott saw this and came up with the Anaconda plan. Scott considered the war a strategy game, and would attack and penetrate the enemy 's forces without destroying all of their troops; focusing mainly on victory. At the beginning of the war Scott, unlike others, thought that the war would be over in more than two years. The war ended in four years. The term Anaconda plan came from Northern press trying to explain Scotts plan. Many people thought that Scotts plan was too passive and difficult. The Union’s effort in the civil war increased greatly on April 19, 1861. At this point Abraham Lincoln created a naval blockade, a system of ships that stops all imports and exports, on the Confederate coastline. This blockade stretched from the Rio Grande to the Chesapeake Bay. At this time Lincoln’s argument was that the Confederacy had no right to secede. Creating this blockade allowed the National warships to attack privateers. Privateers are privately owned and run warships. These ships were used to take the Union’s trade ships. Getting rid of the privateers meant that the Union could transport goods easier. Scott 's anaconda plan needed the Union’s army and navy to surround the Confederacy. After encompassing the Confederacy the army and navy would tighten in, and effectively strangle the South. This contained two
In 1861, the United States was no longer united and its people were at war, in what is commonly known as the American Civil War. This left President Abraham Lincoln in a tight spot on how to go about dealing with the Southern states that had seceded, the Confederacy, who were now at war with the Northern states, the Union. Lincoln met with his generals to devise a strategy by which the Confederate states could be brought back into the Union. General Winfield Scott, commanding general of the Union army, proposed one plan of battle that he had earlier proposed to Major-General George B. McClellan. His plan came to be known as the Anaconda plan. This plan, although it was never technically adopted, ended up being extremely successful and
The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.
In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally
Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity
On July 13, 2008, Taliban fighters launched a major assault on a small U.S. Army outpost in Afghanistan, killing nine soldiers and wounding 27. The story of Wanat is more then just one small group of commanders’ mistakes; it is a window into how the war in Afghanistan went awry and how we can learn from these mistakes to better future missions and future leaders.
Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations
Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.
This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi-headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF-K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H
Freeman Teague Jr. effectively expresses the importance and complexity of communication. At one time the U.S. Army defined communication as the exchange and flow of information and ideas from one person to another; it involves a sender transmitting an idea, information, or feeling to a receiver (Clark, 2015). Throughout this paper we will expound on key communication failures that were exposed during Operation Anaconda. The overall verdict is that Anaconda’s outcome was a success, but its original plan was a resounding failure. Many things contributed to the failure, but this paper will focus on the communication aspect.
Iran took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. The resulting failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, was an international embarrassment for the United States. No single event or decision resulted in the mission’s failure; instead, the failure resulted from a chain of poor decisions. This single operation highlighted the need for a dedicated special operations aviation unit dedicated to the rescue of American citizens and their repatriation. This paper discusses the global situation and some of the poor decisions that were made throughout the entirety of the mission from planning through the crash at Desert One.
The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.