Close Air Support Report

Throughout the history of Air Defense Artillery (ADA), innovative steps were made for the technological advance in weaponry to defend our skies and ground forces. The diverse history and continuous research and development of air defense systems played a vital role in the safety of ground troops and foreign civilians during the Persian Gulf crisis. Though not always in the forefront of battle, ADA had its own vital roles that it played from the time of its birth, and it was no different during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield when necessity helped to bring about the evolution of the PAC-II Patriot missile.

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their AORs [JP-1]. GCCs takes on a lot of responsibility they are normally responsible for a large geographical area; not mention the effective coordination of operations within that area falls on the shoulder of the GCC. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. One plan

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties.

1. (15 pts) Review the Operational Approach Student Aid Slide #7 for this question. Operational Design and the Operational Approach is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” (JP 5-0, III-1). In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided for this exam in Parts 2 and 3, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following.

In today’s digital age, development of new technology and weapons are at an alarming rate, hence arises the need to stay ahead of advancements in order to properly defend the nation, as well as coalition forces and allies. In this period of warfare, the number one threat comes in the form of air breathing and ballistic missiles. During World War II, this threat was present, but was not thought to be prevalent.

The environment impacts aviators, but along with infrastructure, we have to think about how the enemy can use water sources, air/land choke points (mountainous terrain or bridges), or densely built up cities. Throughout the entire mission planning and execution, aviators think ahead for the ground force, commanders, and aircraft. Aviators have to make decisions based on assessment and reassessment of PMESTII-PT/METT-TC and every minute recon/attack pilots are on a mission; they are evaluating, thinking ahead, and reporting all while maintaining the picture for current and future

Although kinetic fires are used to physically destroy enemy capabilities, “the greatest effect of fires is… not the amount of physical destruction, but the effect of that physical destruction on the adversary’s moral strength” (MCWP 3-43.3, 1-1). Fires play a vital role in supporting a commander’s plan to preserve his force. This is achieved by utilizing the targeting process to identify high payoff targets and utilizing fires to destroy or degrade the enemy’s capabilities, interdict their air and missile capabilities, and eroding their will to fight. Specific force protection measures can include counter battery fire and the jamming of electronic surveillance to deny the enemy information about friendly forces. By focusing fires assets on creating disproportionate results through psychological effects, a commander can increase his unit’s productivity and combat effectiveness while simultaneously safeguarding U.S.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties.

Foreign Object Damage Prevention and Management in the Deployed Environment As a result of the United States involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) many Air Force aircraft have been forced to operate in austere and rugged airfields. Force multiplying, rapid global mobility, and overall airpower are directly related to the military's ability to operate in the deployed environment.

This step analyzes each of the COAs developed in the previous step. "The heart of COA analysis is the war-gaming process . . . ." (Artillerization, n.d., "Step 4: Course of Action Analysis" section, ¶ 1). During this step, staff members come up with possible scenarios that could take place during the execution of the mission. The author's contribution to the war-gaming was what would happen if a piece of C3 equipment or capability were rendered unusable due to either malfunction or enemy action.

I chose this book for my first book review for a few reasons. First, to bring to light and to honor the memory of Command Sergeant Major Basil L. Plumley, who recently passed away on October 10, 2012. He is a true inspiration to be followed; a career U.S. Army Infantry Soldier, a Sergeant Major, and key leader during the Battle of Ia Drang. He fought in every major Airborne Operation of World War II, including Operation Husky, D-Day, and Operation Market Garden. He