Critical Reasoning And Battle Analysis : The Battle Of Mogadishu

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

The battle of Ap Bac was a small battle engaged between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the insurgents, or the People Liberation Armed Forces (Viet Cong AKA VC) with the assistance of American’s weapons and advice during the Vietnam War. It took place on 2 January, 1963, near a small village named Ap Bac which is located approximately 65 km southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta. (Starry, 2002). As a senior leader, it is important that we have to be technically and tactically proficient. In order to be proficient, we not only need to be trained, but also we have to know how to gain experience from past battles in history using battle assessment, and critical thinking process to study the battle. That way, we know what needs to be improved, how to sustain it, and how would we execute it better next time. Therefore, studying the history of the battle of Ap Bac will enhance the knowledge of how the commanders used the most effective and efficient method for applying decisive action on the battle field. It would be a successful outcome for the South Vietnamese ARVN, and Kennedy’s administration would have gained more trust from American people for the presence of American troops in Vietnam, if the American advisers and the ARVN’s commanders would have integrated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (ITP) throughout the operations process to identify the gaps of intelligence between human intelligence (HUMINT),

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

Black Hawk Down aka Battle of Mogadishu was a battle that the U.S. soldiers landed into Somalia to capture the two top lieutenants of the renegade warlord and find themselves in a desperate battle with large force against Somalis in 1993. In the movie “Black Hawk Down” they make the Somalis of Mogadishu as being faceless mobs, and baying. There was no effort made in the movie to try to explain why both civilians and militiamen acted so violently to the botched U.S. Gothic Serpent. A previous US air attack in downtown Mogadishu had killed many tribal elders and innocent civilians. This generated a lot of public support for the armed militias. Somalis began to look to the warlords for protection from what they saw as unprovoked American attacks.

Knowledge is key to everything; whatever you’re doing, whether it is planning your daily life or understanding your adversaries you need information. Therefore, the mind is filled with uncertainty without information, with uncertainty come gaps within the information. Although educated guesses are used to fill in gaps, it's still just a guess not intelligence. Most of the times the information are available but usually overlooked by the individual. This type of incidences happens everyday right under our nose but in the military, the result can be catastrophic costing American lives and its resources. On October of 1993 United States Military went though a mission called “Battle of Mogadishu” witch cost many American Soldiers lives. This mission

Then, United Somalia Congress divide into multiple clans which escalate the turmoil through inter-clan warfare. Such warfare destroyed the economy, and left hundreds of thousands of Somalians to perish of starvation.

I am writing this paper to identify and analyze the historic failed mission of Operation: Eagle Claw. Operation Eagle Claw is a prime example of a failed mission due to lack of communication and sharing of knowledge between government agencies and military branches. This operation took five months to plan and took place on April 24, 1980. The mission was proceeded by an attack on the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran. This attack was made by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who was the leader of Iran at the time. In the late 1970’s when Khomeini took over the Iran, Shah fled the country and was eventually granted entrance into the United States by President Carter in order to obtain treatment for his cancer. Khomeini demanded that the US release

Iran took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. The resulting failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, was an international embarrassment for the United States. No single event or decision resulted in the mission’s failure; instead, the failure resulted from a chain of poor decisions. This single operation highlighted the need for a dedicated special operations aviation unit dedicated to the rescue of American citizens and their repatriation. This paper discusses the global situation and some of the poor decisions that were made throughout the entirety of the mission from planning through the crash at Desert One.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle and apply the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. The operation took place during 1971 in Northern Vietnam by United States Special Forces operators. The

The first battle in Fallujah during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is known as Operation Vigilant Resolve. This battle is regarded as one of the biggest single defeats that the United States Military has suffered throughout all its campaigns during OIF. The United States and international media outlets exploited this defeat, which in turn, bolstered Al Qaeda recruiting in Fallujah. This offensive failure and retreat was backed by a huge public outcry for troop withdrawal and successful exploitation of recruiting propaganda by the insurgents.

In August of 1992, President George Bush Sr. sent US soldiers into Somalia to provide humanitarian relief to those Somalis suffering from starvation. The major problems in Somalia started when President Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown by a coalition of opposing clans. Although there were several opposing groups, the prominent one was led by Mohammed Farah Aidid. Following the overthrow of Barre, a massive power struggle ensued. These small scale civil wars led to the destruction of the agriculture in Somalia, which in turn led to the deprivation of food in large parts of the country. When the international community heard of this, large quantities of food were sent to ease Somali suffering. However, clan leaders like Aidid routinely