The military has a saying, "no matter how well you plan an operation, Murphy's Law is always going to change it." As leaders, these unexpected events are something that we have to plan for in order to manage the operational risks. The events of March 4th of 2002, on the mountain ridge of Tahkur Ghar, later known as "Robert's Ridge," are a good example of leaders who overlooked red flags of the mission and ended up being a part of one of the fiercest battles in the Afghanistan War. Operation Anaconda started on March 2nd of 2002 when operational planners laid out the scheme of movements for 2nd Battalion (BN), 3rd Brigade (BDE), 101st Airborne Division, and the 1st BN, 2nd BDE, 10th Mountain Division. These two elements were to assault the
The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
The book Black Hearts opened my eyes to how leadership from a single Officer can have a grappling effect on such a wide range of soldiers from the lowest of ranks. One of the best takeaways from Black Hearts is to never do anything: illegal, unethical, or immoral. Although this is a easy statement to repeat, Black Hearts demonstrates the difficulties that lie behind these words. It has also painted a picture of how leadership can topple extremely quickly from a top down view. The Army is portrayed in a bad light throughout the book relentlessly. This is due to the concentration of poor leadership of the 1-502nd Regiment (Referred to as “First Strike”), a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the real world consequences of when Army leaders become complacent dealing with foreign national soldiers, and the day to day operations while in a combat theatre. To gather lessons learned from the example discussed in order to lower the probability of a reoccurrence among the force. Through the example demonstrate the need for Army leaders to constantly fight against complacency, and the extreme importance that leaders know their soldiers, and place their soldiers’ needs before their own. The scenario discussed was a real incident that took place in Iraq in 2009, at a Coalition Outpost (COP) approximately 30 kilometers south of Mosul, in a city called Hammam al-Alil.
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).
What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through
In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally
However; MG Hagenbeck was only given operational control of certain ground elements that were slated to be involved in the mission. He was not given command of the U.S air component from the Air Force, Navy or Marines, who were slated to support Anaconda ground operations. MG Hagenbeck also did not have command authority of the friendly Afghan forces who were to play a major role in the operation. Afghan forces coupled with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were the “Hammer” that would drive al Qaeda and Taliban fighters toward the “Anvil” composed of U.S. forces and Afghan forces. Anaconda nearly became a crushing defeat for the U.S forces, because of the number of competing commands that were assigned major roles of responsibility in the operation.
On July 13, 2008, Taliban fighters launched a major assault on a small U.S. Army outpost in Afghanistan, killing nine soldiers and wounding 27. The story of Wanat is more then just one small group of commanders’ mistakes; it is a window into how the war in Afghanistan went awry and how we can learn from these mistakes to better future missions and future leaders.
10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9
This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully
The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi-headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF-K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H
made it to Jalalabad in critical conditions. Major General William Elphinestone failed to provide purpose and direction to his staff and subordinate leaders prior to the retreat of Kabul. General Elphinstone did not establish the use of mission order and he did not create a cohesive team through mutual trust. Elphinestone didn’t create a shared understanding, and did not provide a clear commander’s intent to his staff and subordinate leaders.