Operational Level Command And Control Requires Both The

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 1). The six principles of mission command direct leaders to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. These principles enable subordinates that understand their commander’s intent to accomplish missions by adapting to the situation and taking advantage of opportunities as they arise (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 2). Various battles throughout history provide examples of the application of the principles of mission command as well as the failure to adhere to them. The Battle of the Little Bighorn is an example of the latter and marks the “most decisive Native American victory and the worse U.S. defeat during the long Plains Indian War” (History.com Staff, 2009).

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

The ANZAC Campaign at Gallipoli completely failed. The purpose of the Campaign was justified, however its poor planning led to events such as the landing to fail. Additionally, the poor tactics and rough conditions made attempts to break the stalemate be in vain. The evacuation however, was one of the only successes of the whole campaign.

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

Following their success in North Africa, the Allied decision to invade Sicily was an appropriate next step towards defeating Axis powers. Operation HUSKY, the first phase of the Italian campaign, supported the Allied strategic goals of opening Mediterranean shipping lanes, diverting German forces off of the Eastern front and encouraging Italy to exit the Axis. HUSKY resulted in Allied Forces securing the island, despite leadership failures and the ineffective coordination of joint functions at the operational level. A two part analysis of the Allied Force operational level joint functions during Operation HUSKY follows. The first will evaluate the joint function of command and control using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The second will evaluate the integration of two of the remaining joint functions using the definition of integration from joint doctrine.

This mission command analysis evaluates the battle of Team Desobry at the town of Noville, Belgium. These events took place 18-19 December 1944, and later impacted the battle fought at Bastogne during World War II. It is the goal of this review to discuss and analyze three mission command principles displayed during this battle: Create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, and the acceptance of prudent risk. One of the main characters that took part in this story was the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, 10th Armored Division. The commanding officer of this element was Major William R. Desobry. During the events of World War II, the German forces were trying to gain control of the Ardennes to cut off the allies’ supply lines in order to isolate British forces from the American troops. A pivotal task for German forces to attain this goal was to gain access and take control of the Belgian town of Bastogne. However, an important strategic stepping stone to get there was Noville, which is just seven kilometers northeast of Bastogne. Two main reasons made Noville such a critical location for the Germans: First, it had a junction of roads that were important for displacement of German forces to the West. Second, it provided an alternative road to access Bastogne from the north.1

In any mission, the Commander is the most imperative participant. He or she guides the mission to the intended outcome. It is through the commander’s activities that the directed outcome is achieved. Through successful understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing the commanders of Soldiers are able to accomplish the directed mission and thus winning wars. Throughout the role of commander in the Battle of Hamburger Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt attempted the complete these commander’s activities. (ADRP 5-0) The successes and failures of mission command he had, will be explained, giving a better understanding of the Battle of Hamburger Hill and the pivotal turning point in the Vietnam war.

Mission orders may be understood by the leader’s subordinates, however poor training and development amongst other practices may hinder the execution of the commander’s intent. Everything starts with training. Rehearsals are key in knowing what to do and how to react when the time comes. The team may know what to do through the orders, however they will not know how to perform tasks if

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

As the operation began, the Americans and British hoped the French would not resist the Allied landings, and further expected French forces in North Africa would rejoin the anti-Axis alliance. In order to facilitate these hopes, the Allies designated General Dwight D. Eisenhower to command the invasion forces. With an American general leading the forces, the Allies sought to restrict any resistance from Anglophobic French officials and officers in the areas around the invasion beaches and ports. Despite such measures, however, the French did put up some level of resistance at nearly every landing point. Nonetheless, dissension among the various French factions in North Africa limited the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the opposition. Ultimately, the magnitude and rapidity of the Allied

When Rommel had realised he could not win at El Alamein, he sought Hitler’s permission to withdraw his troops. Hitler had refused. Rommel disobeyed and withdrew his troops anyway. By early 1943, Axis forces had retreated to Tunisia and there, outnumbered and short on resources, and caught between the British and the Americans on all sides, they surrendered and North Africa was now in control of the allies.

(7) Command and Control: During the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Allied and Axis commands both had relationship problems. The Axis command initially gave Gen. Ziegler two panzer divisions. Made a decision to give one of those two commands to Gen. Rommel. Those two commands did not communicate with each other. MG Fredendall’s orders were unclear and somewhat incorrect. He also skipped around chain of command and made direct coordination with combat commanders. MG Fredenall did not get along with other Allied

At the 2014 International Conference on World War II held in New Orleans, Louisiana on 6 December, Dr. Roger Cirillo, Director, Book Programs at the Association of United States Army, was asked to speak on the Allied Forces’ strategy to defeat Germany in the fall of 1944. Dr. Cirillo, pulling no punches, questioned the intellect of General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to employ a ‘broad-front’ approach against German forces scattered throughout Europe in late 1944. It was on this issue Eisenhower was at odds with British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery who supported quite a different strategy that would have instead concentrated allied power against Germany’s industrial base utilizing a ‘single-thrust’ attack. A hotly contested debate still today, there is no shortage of opinion concerning the two different strategies. Dr. Cirillo is unmistakably an admirer of British military thinking and how the war may have been influenced by concentrating allied efforts on German centers of gravity, as proposed by Montgomery. Obviously dismissive of the larger U.S. objectives and perhaps narrow-mindedly taking strong opposition to Eisenhower’s broad-front strategy given his British military school training, Dr. Cirillo’s criticism of Eisenhower fails to account for the positive effects of denying the enemy large swaths of territory, American and British public opinion at the time, and efforts to maintain Soviet assistance in the war, and differing thoughts on Germany’s

In February 1941, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel received command of the recently created Afrika Korps. The unit deployed to Libya in order to support the Italian Army that had recently suffered setbacks against the British forces. For the next two years, Rommel’s forces fought across the North African desert against British forces led by Generals Archibald Wavell, Claude Auchinleck, and Bernard Montgomery. The culminating point for this campaign was the two battles of El Alamein, after which the Germans retreated to Tunisia and eventually surrendered. This case study will examine the history, preparation, execution, results, and lessons learned during the Battles of El Alamein and how that defeat helped lead to the overall Axis defeat in World War II (WWII).