Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan

For over 2 centuries, Afghanistan has known virtually no time without war. Beginning around 326 B.C. with the conquests of Alexander the Great, to the Persians, British, Russians and most recently, America and our NATO allies, Afghanistan has been cultivated into the country that it is today through a trial by fire. Regardless of this relentless onslaught of foreign military power, the Afghan people have tirelessly defended their homeland with no outside power ever being able to subdue them completely. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, the country fell into civil war, torn even further apart by fiercely dedicated tribal warlords. This power vacuum led to the rise of a group called the Taliban. Led by a one eyed man

Progress has also been made in repairing and improving the infrastructure of corrections and training facilities” {Security- Canada’s Mentoring Role}. The Canadian forces provide Afghanistan with decisive and influential training to most, if not all Afghanistan National Army (ANA) personnel for them to become more capable and self sufficient when managing its populace. This concept shall assist the Afghanistan economy because if the Afghan Army were finally trained to proficiently secure its people and the nation as a whole, it will cultivate the government to become more effective hitherto, “turn and pave the way for economic development and reconstruction” {Security- Canada’s Mentoring Role}. In addition to the ongoing efforts by the Canadian Forces to mentor and equip the Afghan National Army, “Canada is also providing up to $99 million over three years towards: training, mentoring and equipping the ANA and the ANP; building capacity in administration and logistical support; and complementary initiatives in the justice and correctional systems to support activities of the ANP” {Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan}. In order for the Canadian military to be able to maneuver themselves in the struggling nation of Afghanistan, it is obligatory that these armed forces be provided with the necessary weaponry and arsenal to cope through with their

Afghanistan has been for years a country struggling with authority issues. These struggles date back to the 16th century of the Mughal Empire and continues with the Taliban today. These historic struggles are responsible of the changing nature of political authority in this volatile region of our world. There have been many attempts from other groups to try and “conquer” the land but

With the tales of these three individuals told, it is hard not to feel a sense of pity and uncertainty about Afghanistan and especially the United States’ role in Afghanistan. With the consensus of entering Afghanistan originally being to stop terrorism, throughout Gopal’s book it seems that the goal, or better yet, the idea of wiping terrorism away had certainly been lost. No longer does it seem that the United States is helping, rather that the U.S. is one of the main problems in the country. The details and facts listed in the book open a

As America find herself in today’s “War on Terrorism,” one can easily find a number of similarities between today’s situation and the war in Vietnam. As the Taliban steadily loses control and power over Afghanistan, it becomes exceedingly important to discuss potential replacement governments. Afghanistan is, like Vietnam in the 50’s and 60’s, a very volatile country full of a variety of people speaking different dialects and practicing different religions. It is very important, then, that the government that is installed is one that is capable of maintaining some type of control or authority over its diverse people.

The Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) quarterly report for January is a bleak read. At close to 30%, not only do the Taliban hold more Afghan territory than any time after the 2001 invasion, but "The insurgency is spreading (Afghan forces) thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers." The Taliban trifecta of high-stakes attacks in late 2015 adds weight to SIGAR’s assessment. Moreover, even before militants briefly overran Kunduz, Kandahar airport and besieged Sangin district, UN figures revealed a 19% increase in “security incidents” between August and October.

The war between Afghanistan and the United States has been one that has lasted longer than any war; the civil war combined with both World War I and World War II do not match the duration the United States currently faces with Afghanistan. With both countries engaging little to no military conflict, the U.S. continues to be on Afghanistan’s territory, securing the country from the rise of militias potentially threatening our counterpart’s sovereignty. Many people have been arguing whether the US should withdraw from Afghanistan and when. Currently, as the U.S. plans to withdraw from the Afghan nation, the issue is not one that pertains to the U.S. and Afghanistan, for they are not the only two involved. American forces had planned to leave the opponent’s nation but fear the security along with the sovereignty of Afghanistan continues to be one that is porous. The initiation of the war was the 9/11 attack and has been lasting for 13 years. However, many people complain about the extreme high cost of the war The United States should withdraw completely from Afghanistan because of the high cost of the war, popular opinion’s support, and very few al-Qaeda members are left.

In this book, Schroen gives his straightforward perspective on his role leading the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT) from mid-September to the end of October 2001. Schroen gives a detailed account of the CIA’s infiltration into northeast Afghanistan to support the Northern Alliance (NA) campaign against the Taliban and foreign Arab forces around Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Having worked with Afghan rebels during the Soviet occupation, Schroen was well familiar with the terrain and geography, and also with several of the NA functionaries with whom he would work.

These rural operations of the Afghan Local Police are known as Village Stability Operations. These operations were not intended to be a quick fix, rather a long-term investment. The author asks the question, are the village stability operations a success? Perhaps, the answer can be found in the results of the operations. Although stability in Afghanistan has proved to be an

The Counter Insurgency operations in Vietnam have taught the U.S. a lot that can be applied to Afghanistan. According to Phillips (2015) “Although our understanding and steadfast support can make a significant difference, ultimate success depends on

Outside influence has always be an issue for Afghanistan as demonstrated by the numerous military campaigns that surround its history most notably by Alexander the Great, British, Soviet Russians, and today by Western powers. During 1880-1901 Abdur Rahman Khan came into power. It was at this time Abdur Rahman expressed that the British were “really anxious to see Afghanistan a strong independent Government-a true ally and barrier, “ whereas the Russians wished “to see Afghanistan divided into pieces and very weak, if not entirely cleared out of the way to India.” (Ewans, pg 99). Although considered a strong ruler who re-established the Afghan Government his power came from the reliability of the British for his protection throughout his reign.

The readings this week focused on the development programs and assistance regarding fragile states. Most of the articles focused on different eras of security development and fragile states and practical examples such as Afghanistan while the last article, by Stephen Baranyi and Themrise Khan, stepped away from Afghanistan and focused on other fragile states. There were many themes this week, but the ones I want to address in my paper is the western centric approach to stability and security and the disconnect between policy and on ground action due to bureaucratic barriers to securitization. Though there were other themes present in the articles, these three stood out to me as being the most relevant.

The point of this article is to examine the case that an untimely withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan may not be to the greatest advantage of the United States. The American military vicinity in Afghanistan is a standout amongst the most essential issues of contemporary global relations. Amid the previous decade the subject of the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan has ascended on the political motivation. The American vicinity in Afghanistan is essential, not just for South and Central Asia, and the Middle East, yet for a whole universal group. This article will reach a conclusion in respect to whether American troops ought to finish what has been started and keep its strengths in Afghanistan or ought to the US quit from this nation. In the first piece of this exposition I will display a foundation to the worldwide intrusion of Afghanistan taking after the 9/11 terrorist assaults. In the second part I will analyze contentions why staying in Afghanistan is to American best advantage. These are: Taliban come back to power, destabilization of the district and al - Qaida come back to its bases in Afghanistan. Also I will scrutinize these most noticeably awful - case situations. At last I will look at the contentions of backers for complete or if nothing else a halfway deserting of Afghanistan

The war that was conducted in Afghanistan against the US should prompt other nations that the purpose of war should have a political goal interest and should include military advice but ultimately should be decided by a charismatic civilian leader. “The war in Afghanistan has demonstrated that for all of the vaunted agility and resourcefulness of the U.S. armed forces, the risk of senior commanders' becoming intellectually arrogant and cognitively rigid is real. The COIN paradigm was applied with such unquestioning zeal that critical thought was often suspended.”( Eikenberry 2014). Furthermore, in any future counterinsurgency plan, the security of the citizens (with the help of the military) should be the underlying primary focus. In future counterinsurgent strategy there should be a military civilian plan, the military should find a way to assimilate the population in their security efforts as a way of reassurance. The replication of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) can be implemented to strengthen any future COIN strategy. PRTs include both the population and military efforts to assist in rebuilding the nation. Moreover, counterinsurgency strategy should consider implementing isolating insurgent groups and conducting peace rallies or peace talks amongst the citizens. A final lesson

In the year of 1994, anarchy and complete disorder was scattered throughout Afghanistan. Soviet forces, who have dominated in control since their takeover in 1979, have fled the country and left no law or order (CRF). A villageman known as Mullah Mohammad Omar emerged out of the chaos as leader of this new