Special Operations Forces (SOF): A Comparative Analysis

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

To answer this gap, the Office of Special Warfare (OSW) was developed to be the focal point for USASOC’s UW capability. With this change, each 4th Battalion across the regiment was redesigned to build a build a full spectrum UW capability in support of the Theatre Special Operations Command (TSOC) and Joint Force Commanders. It was during this re-design that the modern Jedburgh was re-born. Much like the World War II era Jedburghs, many skilled operators across the regiment jumped at the opportunity to enter a new phase of conflict and increase their skills in the application of unconventional warfare. With this personal commitment came the understanding that time would be allotted to build a small cohesive team with training and education needed to succeed in complex environment. This theory would soon be diminished because many of the newly selected Jedburghs, riding on the success of Jedburghs some seventy-two years ago, would be thrown straight into complex environment without the needed education and training. Premature operationalization of the Jedburghs has effected training, education, and organizational design needed to build a long lasting unconventional warfare

SOF were organized into five individual task forces with specific roles and responsibilities: Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N), know as Task Force Dagger; Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (JSOTF-S), known as Task Force K-Bar; Task Force Sword; The Joint Inter Agency Task Force – Counter Terrorism (JIATF-CT), known as Task Force Bowie; and

While analyzing the North Africa conflict, a combination of service capabilities would be required to achieve the desired end state of deterring and if necessary, the defeat of Algerian guerilla aggression to prevent regional and global destabilization. Taking into account the current military landscape that exists today, a joint task force (JTF) would be the ideal military response of the United States and collation partner’s while utilizing the regional military assets. Intelligence suggests guerilla forces are capable of a full scale offensive into Morocco in less than 36 hour notice, bringing the factors of time, force and space into consideration.

General Hugh Shelton was selected as a leader for this assignment since I served in the United States Army’s Group Support Company, 3rd Special Forces Group as he was the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command before he was nominated as the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton was the 14th Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of

The killing of Bin Laden was one of the biggest examples of how a good Military task force like Navy seals has become. Arkin and Priest (2001) give us an idea how the Joint Special Operations team has been improving over the years and how they carry out top secret missions. When you have a good Military task force then their a higher chance to save hostages lives and we been seeing a trend in where government send out their best units to save those hostage. They can come out saving the hostage or not, but the main idea of Special Military Task force is to do the best to save them. The government develops a plan to save them instead of following appeasement because they will not give in demands from terrorist. This method

1. (15 pts) Review the Operational Approach Student Aid Slide #7 for this question. Operational Design and the Operational Approach is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” (JP 5-0, III-1). In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided for this exam in Parts 2 and 3, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following.

Operation Eagle Claw required too much detailed integration between multiple military services without a central leadership. As a result two organizations formed. The first was Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) the other is U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). JSOC in simple terms is USSOCOM’s little brother. USSOCOM is established to provide joint leadership. JSOC is there to train all special operation forces to work together but falls under USSOCOM. This is important because it allows everybody to work on the same page. JSOC also allows other services such as the Air Force to train with the

Conventional warfare follows the single battle concept, where two or more well defined forces using weapons that target the opposing force. The contiguous battle-space is well defined with a deep, close and rear area allowing the force commander to array forces that can be visually displayed in a linear graphic. This does not hold true in an unconventional warfare, where the rear area may also be the close and deep fight and forces may target the civilian population either through direct, indirect or propaganda attacks. The will of the people play an important part in unconventional warfare and their support to either force is equally important. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps force in readiness is capable

The Army describes the Rangers’ as, “capable of conducting squad through regimental size operations and are resourced to maintain exceptional proficiency, experience and readiness” (U.S. Army Rangers: The 75th Ranger Regiment). After serving as a Ranger a soldier can then be apply and be accepted into the Green Berets. For both the Rangers and Green Berets Special Forces training is required. This includes Special Operations Preparation Course, Special Forces Assessment and Selection, Special Forces Qualification Course, and Live Environment Training.

Stability and Support Operations (SASO) covers a wide variety of missions performed by the United States military. According to DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations”.1 The military has evolved from an “either-or” point-of-view, to an all inclusive method of conducting operations.2 Prior to the Vietnam War, “There was no organization in the United States government trained and equipped to perform this mission, and little incentive for existing institutions to adapt to meet the need for such an organization even if that need had been widely recognized.”3 This evolution has

In 1987, the US Special Operation Command was established in order to carry out classified missions which includes gathering intelligence, capturing high-value targets, and training foreign troops (Turse). Each branch of the military have their own special operations force that operates under the command of Special Operation Command. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, SFOD, and Green Berets are the few special operation forces that part of Special Operation Command (Turse). The expansion and the increase use of US Special Operation Force would allow special operators to continue to conduct operations in global hotspots, to train with their international partners more often, and to respond to a

A Line of Effort (LOE) is a conceptual/logical line that connects tasks to objectives, as well as identifies measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of performance (MOP), and indicators, essential assessments nodes that focus energy towards accomplishing the end state. In order to assuage the commanders concerns regarding the objectives and milestones missing from the LOE, I propose that the following objective be added to the Establish Civil Security LOE: Conduct targeted raids with Host Nation Security Forces to attack key insurgent leadership and cells. This objective bridges the gap as 1/1 SBCT and Host Nation partner to transition from combat operations to a policing role as we seek to secure the people and separate them from insurgents and hostile activity. Furthermore, it is imperative that the kinetic initiative is maintained through deliberate targeted raids with

The first military establishment was formed before the United States was officially declared a country for the purpose of meeting the needs of the colonists during the American Revolution. The Army’s mission is to fight and win the Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across a full range of military operations. Although the history of the United States Army is deeply rooted in the country’s history, the implementation of the United States Special Forces Operations Unit is fairly young having been established in May 1952 yet unannounced to the public until 1954. In an effort to uphold the Army’s mission, the Special Forces Operations Unit was initially formed to assist with

The 'Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) case study is regarding the U.S-Philippines partnership in counter-terrorism (CT) operations that took place from 2002-2011. The CT operation was titled as 'Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) and was conducted by the partnership of Philippine security forces and US Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). The CT cooperation took place at three levels, tactical, operational, and strategic. The role of JSOTF was that of 'advise and assist' whereby ground operations were conducted by the Philippine forces. The US cooperation for CT in Philippines was guided by the Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and a policy and action framework to act as a binding framework for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational CT operations using full range of military operational capacity. The OEF-P was also conducted by incorporating JP 5-0 principles and guidelines of engagement. The OEF-P took place in Southern Philippines. Following is an assessment how the US forces used termination, military end state, and objectives of operational design (Joint Pub 5-0, page III-18) to develop and refine their operational approach.