Essay about The United States and Irregular Warfare Challenges

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The most important imperative of four in the Army Campaign Plan is “develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century” because in the future leaders will deal a “tough realistic environment” and must be willing to adapt to the mission, threat or operational environment. We must “train soldiers and leaders to ensure they are prepared to accomplish the mission across the range of military operations while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations . This is the eighth of twenty Army Warfighting Challenges enduring first order problems, the solutions to which will improve current and future force combat effectiveness. These challenges are reviewed and updated as needed to remain applicable for the future force.

The very politicians and diplomats that enable the new Domocratic state will also limit the military to the minimum necessary. According to Dr. Gardner in his lecture Clausewitz believed the maximum military effort would be based on a combination of “diplomacy and the amount of military force to adequately achieve it”. I contend that our nations focus on fighting as a State and forming States that resemble ours those very same politicians and diplomats would be hesitant to due what is truly needed to stop a negative force such as Communism or Terrorism. After Desert Storm Saddam Hussein was allowed to stay in power from 1991 till 2003 when the US led forces to remove him from power (Hawkins pg 309). This apprehension to take difinitive action is not unique to the United States, but as Hawkins points out was evident in the Roman Empire some 1,300 years ago when it shifted from moderations(limited war) to full war. F.J. Bing West highlights the need to go "All-in" versus achieve the maximum with minimal cost which is the American position of late (pg 393). State-to-State engagements are suited for Full Wars, but the current GWOT is being fought as a limited war primarily in 3-4 states globally.

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

The United states Military is made up of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard branches, however the Army is the only branch that has ever issued a conscription or draft and has done so many times during its wars. The Draft was abolished in 1973 in favor of an all volunteer army, but men of draft age still to this day have to register to the Selective Service System so a draft can be readily applied if needed. The draft system recruits and places men into the military during a time of need for soldiers. During the Vietnam War and Cold War many people found the draft controversial and unfair, and chose to protest or completely disobey the draft system. Although the Vietnam War draft was thought by many Americans to be an

Army soldiers are every little boy’s not only favorite toy but also a model of what they want to be when they are older. At least they were for me, all I could think about was how I wanted to be in the United States Marine Corps. I would be big, strong, indestructible… but as I grew older I realized just how easily I could be destroyed. Army soldiers turned into video games that featured drag races and bloody battlefields. Once again, I felt indestructible and on top of the world. I could win any race against my friends and in war games, I was the one who would always have to save my friends lives. However, when I was twelve years old I realized just how different life can be from video games, especially when life can include drugs such as heroin. What started as an effort to be looked at as tough to my friends ended with me waking up in a hospital after overdosing on heroin. This quote on quote heroic act of being brave enough to try this drug put me into AA. This is a decision that has stuck with me and plagued me since the very first moment I tried it. Heroin is a highly addictive drug that is nearly impossible to stop using and even harder to stop craving. All over the world there are other children as well as adults who have not only tried heroin but are also addicted to it. Addiction to heroin is a very real and serious matter and one that should not be taken lightly.

The United States Military faces many challenges engaging in conflicts around the world. Stretched thin, the elements of war evolves from AirLand Battle to Unified Land Operations. From the Cold war to Operation Iraqi Freedom the way of the military is winning on offense, winning decisively, while maintaining the initiative.

To paraphrase the quote attributed to Trotsky, “We may not be interested in insurgency but insurgency is interested in us.” The United States faces this dilemma. The question remains how to prepare for this amidst competing interests and threats. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, while prioritizing conventional warfare, recognizing irregular warfare as the most significant short term threat to national interests and conventional warfare the most threatening in the long term. This paper will compare and contrast the considerations for these types of warfare, explain why the U.S. should prioritize conventional operations while preparing for both, and describe the short and long term

The Army and Marines face a rapidly changing operational environment, requiring difficult decisions on how to allocate limited resources to address emerging capabilities and remain a relevant element of national power. While there is no way to predict exactly what capabilities they will need in the future, history indicates that land forces will be

Over the course of last 100 years, the United States has been involved in over ten military conflicts. With each and every conflict SIGINT collection and analysis has grown and matured. Of all the SIGINT platforms no platform has had a more far reaching impact on the battle field then Prophet Spiral version 1 Collection system. From the Prophet Spiral 1 to the newly fielded Prophet Enhanced, the prophet system has allowed commanders real time access to valuable SIGINT intelligence and Electronic Warfare unlike any time in history.

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The nature of war is enduring yet the character of war changes over time. Current US strategic guidance is advancing the point of view that since the character of war has changed to focus on irregular wars then the US military should prepare for a future of irregular wars. This shift in focus forgets that the nature of war is enduring and in order to be successful, we must prepare for all types of conflict. This paper will define the types of conflict and the likelihood of each followed by a discussion of US strategic guidance and ending with an analysis of the training resources and force structure requirements needed to achieve success for all types of

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

“The hearts and mind (HAM) theory is identified as winning the hearts and minds of the population which is a technique based on the implementation of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy of persuading the population to support the government and reject the insurgents.” The counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy as outlined by President Obama and General Petraeus’s most closely embrace is the heart and minds (HAM) theory. President Obama speech identified the United States strategic approach with Afghanistan in three elements. The three core elements addressed by President Obama during his speech on the strategy in Afghanistan are identified as: 1) utilize the military effort to create conditions for transition, 2) a civilian surge that