U.s. Military Campaign Planning

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Whether she knew it or not, Mother Theresa was talking about the Joint Planning Process. She best describes this process as teamwork. The use of teamwork, or the Joint Planning Process, by leaders of the Armed Forces during Operation Anaconda allowed for planning considerations critical to the success of the operation. This paper will explain the seven steps of the Joint Planning Process, and how these steps or the lack of these steps will dictate mission success or failure as seen in Operation Anaconda.

1. (15 pts) Review the Operational Approach Student Aid Slide #7 for this question. Operational Design and the Operational Approach is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” (JP 5-0, III-1). In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided for this exam in Parts 2 and 3, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following.

At the close of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US military ended with varied to questionable results. This is because US policymakers and military leaders did not adjust to the emergence of new conditions due to their dependence on medium structure problem framing. The Army Design Methodology (ADM) is a tool military organizations should use in adaptive environments to develop solutions for complex problems. To understand why the ADM is a critical tool for military organizations, military professionals need to understand the impacts of ill-structured problems on planning and execution and the potential influence the ADM will have on their organization. Once military professionals understand the influence the ADM has on ill-structured problems, they can begin to consider how to integrate the ADM into planning.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

Destroying Iraq’s key society underpinnings risked effective American post-war governance and put the invasion force Commander’s objectives at odds with the overall strategic objective. General Franks misunderstood the operational environment, misdiagnosed the problem and pursued an operational approach that inhibited post-invasion success.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

General Petraeus’ redefined operational approach successfully implemented counterinsurgency operations, engaged the populace and dominated offensive operations integral in defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq. In essence, General Petraeus’ revised operational approach included the challenges of engaging the Iraqi people as partners, the surge of forces needed in counterinsurgency operations, Iranian interventionism, and dominating and defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq. Domination (Phase III) defined includes operational focus on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or control of the operational environment including full employment of joint force capabilities and sequencing of forces into the operational area.16 (JP5-0, p. xxiv) In that, General

Within days of Iraqi forces invading Kuwait in 1990, President Bush publicly backed the United Nations’ (UN) stance on the incursion with four national strategic objectives and determined that, ‘if invited, US forces would be deployed to deter further Iraqi attacks, defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN resolutions.’ From the national strategic objectives, the military end-state is deduced. The military end-state is a conceptual element of operational design which describes the conditions that forces must achieve to attain strategic objectives/ hand over main effort responsibilities. The military end-state does not necessarily indicate the end of a military activities to attain national objectives. While one specific national objective would not

Baghdad in 2006 was a place of bias, controversy, and terror. The capital of Iraq was shaking not only by their new government that reflected dealmaking not meritocracy but, also with an internal religious struggle that was peaking with seventy or more deaths a day. Death was far too easy in Iraq, the United States was in the search for the for the best approach in a hostile environment where the identity of the enemy is masked by the surrounding civilians. The pending question that comes from the war in Iraq war, What is the right approach to for the U.S. military to take in Baghdad. When the Bush Administration took a look at their current state they were in and they found three approaches that were all very different. To get out, to hand over Iraq back to the people after stabilizing it, and the surge were the options that the President and his advisors had to choose from.

Complex and interrelated concerns led United States (US) decision-makers to undertake the 2003 invasion, and subsequent occupation, of Iraq by United States military forces. Preceding the invasion, justifications provided by the Bush administration centered around practical considerations for disrupting terrorist groups, eliminating any weapons of mass destruction threat posed by the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, and the long-term prospect of establishing an example of democracy within the Middle East. However, during the early phases of the occupation, when it became clear that purported links between terrorist organizations and Iraq’s leader reflected questionable intelligence analysis, US leaders brought to the fore arguments regarding the spread of

After numerous attempts to resolve the mounting tensions between the Iraqi and feuds between Kuwait then U.S President George H. Bush and his carefully assembled staff derived a plan that would ultimately prove to be one of the more thought of and a great plan. In this brief exert I will talk about the overview and outcome of air war aspect of the campaign. The Air Campaign Plan was derived from the Presidents objectives and a planning model developed and formed by the Air Staff’s deputy director. There were only 5 objectives and they were Isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime, Gain and maintain air supremacy to permit unhindered air operations, Destroy NBC warfare capability, render the Iraqi army and its mechanized equipment in Kuwait ineffective, causing its collapse and Eliminate Iraq’s offensive military capability by destroying major parts of key military production, infrastructure, and power projection capabilities. (https://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/gulf/gwtx)

The use of military force was justified given a threat of the Iraqi army and the threat it posed to American security. However, in 2002, a report generated for the Naval College highlighted the military capabilities of the Iraqi forces and its disproportion and imbalance with comparison to U.S. military capabilities. However, to prove that the case of Iraq does not comply with the theory of realism, it is necessary to examine the degree to which Iraq posed a security threat to the United States. The above-mentioned report was proof that Iraq had the capabilities to sustain a defensive war at best, meaning Iraq would have difficulty sustaining a defensive war which is of course, much easier than instigating an offensive conflict. Thus, it is highly improbable that the Iraqi military forces were ever a substantial threat to the security of the United

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

For the first eighteen days of March in the spring of 2002, coalition forces fought Al Qaeda and the Taliban for the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The operation was named Anaconda because the intent of the coalition forces was to surround and squeeze the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Shah-i-Kot Valley into suppression and destroy them. Operation Anaconda was the most aggressive plan of Operation Enduring Freedom to that point, and ultimately, was a decisive coalition victory that resulted in fragmented enemy forces in the area for years. However, during Operation Anaconda, the Coalition Joint Task Force Commander and his staff made fundamental errors in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) through assumptions, command relations, and unity of command.