1) Is there a separating equilibrium in the game above? If so, what are the equilibrium strategies of the candidate and the admission officer, and what are the beliefs of the admission officer? What constraints need to be satisfied?

Microeconomic Theory
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ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter2: Mathematics For Microeconomics
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 2.15P
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A master student interested in pursuing a PhD is deciding between two courses: advanced
game theory x = A and introduction to game theory x = I. The student can be one of
two types: 0= L or 0= H.
The PhD admission officer can observe the courses chosen by the student x = {A, I} but
not the type of the student 0. Before observing the course chosen by the student, she
believes both types are equally likely. She admits students only if she is sure that they
are type 0 = H (that is if she believes P(0 = H|x) = 1).
The student gets 10 units of utility from being admitted to a PhD and 0 units if not
admitted, and pays costs c(0) if she chooses advanced game theory and costs 0 if she
chooses introduction to game theory. We assume that c(H) = 0 < c(L) = 15.
1) Is there a separating equilibrium in the game above? If so, what are the equilibrium
strategies of the candidate and the admission officer, and what are the beliefs of the
admission officer? What constraints need to be satisfied?
Transcribed Image Text:A master student interested in pursuing a PhD is deciding between two courses: advanced game theory x = A and introduction to game theory x = I. The student can be one of two types: 0= L or 0= H. The PhD admission officer can observe the courses chosen by the student x = {A, I} but not the type of the student 0. Before observing the course chosen by the student, she believes both types are equally likely. She admits students only if she is sure that they are type 0 = H (that is if she believes P(0 = H|x) = 1). The student gets 10 units of utility from being admitted to a PhD and 0 units if not admitted, and pays costs c(0) if she chooses advanced game theory and costs 0 if she chooses introduction to game theory. We assume that c(H) = 0 < c(L) = 15. 1) Is there a separating equilibrium in the game above? If so, what are the equilibrium strategies of the candidate and the admission officer, and what are the beliefs of the admission officer? What constraints need to be satisfied?
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