Answered: 1- Q. Please define the terms with an…

Business

Economics

1- Q. Please define the terms with an example Commanded Economic Commercial Risk Common Law

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.6P

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The Minister of Transport released its Festive season road accident statistics which shows that the probability of drivers committing an accident is 8% with utility U(H) = √H, where H stands for year income. The Minister further claims these Festive season road accidents cost the state (in terms of claims lodged) an average of R84 000 per annum. The Road Accident Fund is an insurance scheme providing compulsory indemnity cover to victims of vehicle accidents and taxi drivers. (a) Suppose that an average commuter earns R84 000 per annum. What is the expected utility of each commuter if the driver decides not to take insurance. (b) What is the cost of insurance policy to the Road Accident Fund? (c) Due to high accident rates during Festive season, the road accident fund has issued a warning to the government that the fund will be insolvent soon. Advise the Minister on the cost of insurance that can collapse the scheme
The Minister of Transport released its Festive season road accident statistics which shows that the probability of drivers committing an accident is 8% with utility U(H) = √H, where H stands for year income. The Minister further claims these Festive season road accidents cost the state (in terms of claims lodged) an average of R84 000 per annum. The Road Accident Fund is an insurance scheme providing compulsory indemnity cover to victims of vehicle accidents and taxi drivers. (a) Suppose that an average commuter earns R84 000 per annum. What is the expected utility of each commuter if the driver decides not to take insurance. (b) What is the cost of insurance policy to the Road Accident Fund?
Question 3 Consider the following airline capacity allocation problem with buy-up. The total capacity is 100.There are three classes. All class demands follow normal distribution. The fare prices and demand statistics are given as follows: Class Fare Mean Std. Dev. 1 1000 17 6 2 900 45 15 3 500 90 20 Suppose that if a class 3 demand is rejected booking, each individual has a probability of 0.3 to become a class 2 demand; and if a class 2 demand is rejected booking, each individual has a probability of 0.2 to become a class 1 demand. The airline company needs to determine the nested protection levels. Use @risk simulation optimization tofind the optimal decisions. (Please round all the simulated numbers and solutions to the nearest integer.)
The Minister of Transport released its Festive season road accident statistics which shows that the probability of drivers committing an accident is 8% with utility , where H standsfor year income.The Minister further claims these Festive season road accidents cost the state (in terms of claims lodged) an average of R84 000 per annum. The Road Accident Fund is an insurance scheme providing compulsory indemnity cover to victims of vehicle accidents and taxi drivers. (a) Suppose that an average commuter earns R84 000 per annum. What is the expected utility of each commuter if the driver decides not to take insurance. (b) What is the cost of insurance policy to the Road Accident Fund? (c) Due to high accident rates in South Africa during the Festive season, the Road AccidentFund has issued a warning to government that the fund will be insolvent soon. Advise the Minister on the cost of insurance that can collapse the scheme. please answer a,b,c
Tom, who has a utility-of-wealth function U(w) = ln(w + 10), has $500 of income before tax and is taxed at a rate of 25% of earned income. If he is caught underreporting his income he will have to pay the taxes owed and in addition will pay a fine of $2 for every dollar of income he failed to report. How much income will he conceal (i.e., fail to report) if the probability of being caught is 0.1? Also find the market opportunity line and determine the minimum amount of fine such that there is no tax evasion at all.
Government provided social insurance is most beneficial in the cases where the probability of adverse events is _____ to calculate and the costs of the adverse events are _____. a.hard/low b.easy/high c.easy/low d.hard/high
QUESTION 42 Consider the risk-neutral case of the ‘law enforcement using fines’ model. What is the optimal fine for double parking in Econville, if the probability of detection is 0.25, and the harm associated with double parking is $100? A. $400 B. $200 C. $50 D. The optimal fine can be calculated based on the information provided, but it is not listed above E. This question cannot be answered unless we know the average offender's benefit from double parking
An individual has the utility function U(I) = I^(1/2), where I is their net income. (Note that I to the exponent/power of 1/2 is the same as the square root of I.) The individual starts with $1600 in income. The individual has a 20% probability of being very sick, 30% probability of being slightly sick, and 50% probability of being healthy. If the individual is sick, they lose net income because they need to pay healthcare costs. The healthcare costs are $1600 if they are very sick, $700 if they are slightly sick, and $0 if they are healthy. Please use this information for the following parts of this question unless otherwise specified. What is the individual's expected utility? Suppose a health insurance company offers the individual a full insurance contract. What is the actuarially fair, full insurance premium for this individual? What is the individual's expected utility if they purchase a full insurance contract at the actuarially fair, full insurance premium?
Emissions of nitrogen oxides, which are major constituents of smog, can be modeledusing a normal distribution. Let x denote the amount of this pollutant emitted (inparts per billion) by a randomly selected vehicle. Suppose the distribution of x can bedescribed by a normal distribution with μ = 1.6 and σ = 0.4. A city wants to offer somesort of incentive to get the worst polluters off the road. What emission levelsconstitute the worst 10% of the vehicles?
Suppose the large number of bike accidents in a small town results in new legislation that requires all citizens of the town to wear specialized bike helmets when riding. These new helmets reduce the probability of head trauma by 25% during a bike accident. While the new helmets the probability of a serious head injury resulting from a bike accident, they also incentivize cyclists to ride safely, which could the number of bike accidents and thus head injuries to cyclists.
If your worker works hard there is a 3/5 possibility that revenues will be $150 and a 2/5 probability that revenues will be $50. If she works at a lower level of effort, there is a 50% chance of each revenue outcome. Working hard costs her $6. Working moderately costs $3. Her outside utility is zero. She is risk-neutral, with utility equal to W - C , where W is the wage and C is the Cost of Effort (3 or 6 depending on whether she works with low or high effort, resp.) If you could contract for effort, would it be profitable to induce high effort? Explain why. What would your profits be? If you cannot contract for effort, find an incentive-compatible pay scheme that will induce high effort. Set up the incentive and participation constraints and find the z (payment when revenue is 150) and y (payment when revenue is 50) where both are exactly satisfied. Would it be profitable to use this scheme? Why? Now suppose that y can never be negative. What incentive compatible scheme will give…
Consider a gamble/lottery in which a coin is tossed rapidly until a tail comes up. 2m rupee is given if the tail comes up at the mth toss. Let the individual be risk neutral, having u(x) = x where x is the amount of winning. Find the expected utility from the lottery.