(1) Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C, = 60Q, and C, = 60Q,, where Q, is the output of Firm 1 and Q, is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P 300 – Q Where Q=Q,+Q. a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. b. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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Chapter12: Price And Output Determination: Oligopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
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(1) Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms
in the market. Their costs are given by C, = 60Q and C, = 60Q,, where Q, is the
output of Firm 1 and Q, is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following
demand curve:
P = 300 – Q
Where Q=Q+ Q2
a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this
equilibrium.
b. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many
widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit.
c. Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output
and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in part (b) above?
d. Returning to the duopoly of part (b), suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement
but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will Firm 2
produce? What will be each firm's profit?
Transcribed Image Text:(1) Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C, = 60Q and C, = 60Q,, where Q, is the output of Firm 1 and Q, is the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P = 300 – Q Where Q=Q+ Q2 a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. b. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. c. Suppose Firm 1 were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm 1's profit differ from that found in part (b) above? d. Returning to the duopoly of part (b), suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will Firm 2 produce? What will be each firm's profit?
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