5 Suppose that a person’s demand curve for physician office visits is P = 200 – 20Q, where P is the price of an office visit, and Q is the number of physician visits per year. Also, suppose that the marginal cost of an office visit is always $60. c. Suppose this person obtains health insurance. The policy has no deductible, but has a coinsurance rate of 50 percent. How many visits will occur now? d. Suppose that the policy has no deductible but has a $20 co-payment. How many visits will occur now? e. Suppose the policy has a $20 co-payment and a $500 deductible. How many visits will occur now? f. Calculate the deadweight losses in the policies described in parts c, d, and e.

5 Suppose that a person’s demand curve for physician office visits is P = 200 – 20Q, where P is the price of an office visit, and Q is the number of physician visits per year. Also, suppose that the marginal cost of an office visit is always $60. c. Suppose this person obtains health insurance. The policy has no deductible, but has a coinsurance rate of 50 percent. How many visits will occur now? d. Suppose that the policy has no deductible but has a $20 co-payment. How many visits will occur now? e. Suppose the policy has a $20 co-payment and a $500 deductible. How many visits will occur now? f. Calculate the deadweight losses in the policies described in parts c, d, and e.

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter7: The Market For Health Insurance

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11QAP

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4 Suppose that a person’s demand curve for physician office visits is P = 200 – 20Q, where P is the price of an office visit, and Q is the number of physician visits per year. Also, suppose that the marginal cost of an office visit is always $60. c. Suppose this person obtains health insurance. The policy has no deductible, but has a coinsurance rate of 50 percent. How many visits will occur now? d. Suppose that the policy has no deductible but has a $20 co-payment. How many visits will occur now? e. Suppose the policy has a $20 co-payment and a $500 deductible. How many visits will occur now? f. Calculate the deadweight losses in the policies described in parts c, d, and e.
Suppose, if ill, that Fred’s demand for health services is summarized by the demand curve Q = 50 − 2P , where P is the price of services. How many services does he buy at a price of $20? Suppose that Fred’s probability of illness is 0.25. What is the actuarially fair price of health insurance for Fred with a zero coinsurance rate? If the insurance company pays Fred’s entire loss, will the insurance company offer him insurance at the actuarially fair rate? Why? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
Suppose that Elaine’s demand for doctor visits per year is given by the equation: P = 250 – 20Q, where Q is the number of doctor visits and P is the price. The marginal cost of providing this service is fixed at $130 per patient. What is the efficient level of visits per year? What would be the total cost to provide the efficient level of visits? On a supply/demand graph, illustrate this situation; label the efficient levels from part (a). If Elaine obtains insurance with no deductible and a copayment of $10 per visit, how many times would she visit the doctor per year? In total, how much does Elaine pay out of pocket for her visits and how much does the insurer have to pay? Calculate the deadweight loss resulting from the insurance policy and show this region on your graph. What happens to the size of the deadweight loss as the copayment increases? Briefly explain why the insurance policy can induce moral hazard.
Do you think Canada's universal health care program can alleviate problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection in the private insurance markets? Why or why not? John's utility curve over total wealth is given by U(W) =VW (i.e. square root of W). Suppose that he has a 50% chance of being healthy. If he is healthy, he gets all his wealth-$10,000. If he becomes sick, he only has $3,600 remaining after medical expenditures. Calculate John's wealth and utility when he does and does not get sick, his expected utility, expected wealth, and his expected loss. Now he has the option of buying health insurance Calculate the maximum amount John would be willing to pay to fully insure against the cost of the sickness. How much is the actuarially fair and risk premium? Suppose that society consists of large, equal numbers of identical male and identical female consumers. Male consumers are similar to John; female consumers differ only in that they face a 25% probability of being sick, but…
Julia is a 28- year-old nonsmoking , non-drinking female of normal weight Because of adverse selection in health insurance , (A) She will be charged less for her premiums than people who are higher risks ) B)She is less likely to buy health insurance than the average person, because policy premiums are based on expected medical expenditures of people who are less healthy than she is ( C) When she get health insurance , she will be less likely to take care of herself. ) D)She must get health insurance early in life, and is likely to lose health insurance if she smokes , drinks to excess, or gains weight. E) She is more likely than the average person to buy health insurance , because she is more likely to be offered it.
Which one among these is not one factor that makes health care service difficult to insure? 1.future expendature on health care is uncertain 2.the payment for each health procedure are determined by insurers 3.Health care providers are paid based on their service rather then their outcome from their service
Explain how each of these situations will affect the quantity demanded of health insurance: d) New technologies that enable medical illness to be predicted more accurately. e) A tendency among buyers to become less risk, on average.
Suppose that there are 2 types of plans available to you. Plan A has a deductible of $500, with 10 percent co-insurance rate for many health care services. Plan B has a deductible fo $1000, with 35 percent co-insurance rate. Plan A costs $200 per month in premiums while Plan B costs $80. Discuss characteristics of people who would choose Plan A versus Plan B. Assuming that both plan types exist in the market, who would likely choose Plan B over Plan A? What plan would you choose?
What provision of federal law makes employer-based health insurance even more attractive to most EMPLOYEES who receive it than just the value of the premium? O Insured employees can take a tax deduction for the entire amount paid to doctors for the employee's treatment even if much of the cost was paid by insurance. Employer-based health insurance offers much better coverage than other types of insurance Employer-based health insurance offers lower copays and deductibles than other types of insurance The value of health insurance paid by an employer is not taxable income for the employee
Suppose that the graph below illustrates the demand for healthcare services given a coinsurance plan of 25%, what would be the expected change if the participant changed jobs and received a plan with 100% coinsurance?
Suppose that consumers spend their income on either health insurance or on a“composite good”. Find the optimal bundle of health insurance (HI) and other goods (G) given the following budget constraint and utility function. How much utility does this bundle give the individual? Put HI on the x axis of any graphs. Budget constraint: 1600 = 160*HI + 20*GUtility function: U=HI*G where MRS = -G/HI
Suppose your preferences can characterized by the simple utility function U = √C, where C is consumption. You enjoy rock climbing, where you have a 10% chance of get- ting injured and losing $50,000. Your income (and therefore consumption) in the uninjured state is $90,000. What is the most you are willing to pay for an insurance policy? What is the fee for a fair insurance?