5. Use the given information, to answer the following questions.. P = 200 - (Q: + Qz) ---- industry demand TC = 10Q1 ---- total cost of Firm 1 TC2 = 10Q2 ---- total cost of Firm 2 he Phi a. Derive firm l's reaction function b. Derive firm 2's reaction function AY c. Compute for the firms' Cournot equilibrium output.
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- Please solve all the parts and only typed answer The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 16,000 – 4Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 4,000QL and CF (QF) = 6,000QF. What is the follower’s reaction function? Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: Determine the equilibrium market price. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: Follower profits:Consider a duopoly market with 2 firms. Aggregate demand in this market is given by Q = 500 – P, where P is the price on the market. Q is total market output, i.e., Q = QA + QB, where QA is the output by Firm A and QB is the output by Firm B. For both firms, marginal cost is given by MCi = 20, i=A,B. Assume the firms compete a la Cournot. 1. What are the equilibrium quantities? 2. What is the total quantity supplied on this market? 3. What is the equilibrium price in this market?Question 1 (40 points) Consider a homogeneous duopoly market where two firms compete in prices. Demand is given by D 8-2p, where p is price. Marginal cost of production is 2. a)lf the individual capacity of both firms is 2, is there an equilibrium in pure strategies? If so, what are the equilibrium prices? If not, provide a proof. b) Consider then that a third firm enters the market and that all three firms have a capacity of 2. Does an equilibrium in pure strategies exist? If so, what are the equilibrium prices? If not, why not? c) Does you answer under b) change if the firms' capacities are respectively equal to 1, 2 and 3?.
- only typed answer The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 26,000 −4Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 2,000QL and CF (QF) = 4,000QF. a. What is the follower’s reaction function? QF = − QL b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price. $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: $ Follower profits: $1.In differentiated oligopoly,the elasticity of individual market demand is smaller than in the case of pure oligopoly.Explain this statement in not more three sentences 2.As a prospective production manager of an agribusiness firm whose average variable cost of production is greater than the price per unit of its product in a competitive market indicate ,in not more than four sentences, how would you advice management concerning the operations of the firm 3.Assuming you are the production Economist in a farm firm whose elasticity of production is negative indicate,in not more than 3 sentences, how would you advice management concerning the operations of the firm1. Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inversedemand function P = 960-6Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of$60 and has no fixed costs.a. Assuming perfect competition, computei. Equilibrium price and quantityii. Profits and producer surplusiii. Consumer surplus and total surplusb. Assuming Cournot duopoly, computei. Reaction functions for each firmii. Profits of each firmiii. Consumer surplusiv. Total welfare loss relative to perfect competition (if any)c. Assuming the firms collude and act as a monopolist, computei. Equilibrium price and quantityii. Total profitsiii. Consumer surplusiv. Total welfare loss relative to perfect competition (if any)d. Rank the output quantities, profits, and total welfare by the three marketstructures above
- A10 Consider an industry with 2 firms, each firm with marginal costs equal to 0. Market demand curve is given by Q=60- P. With 2 firms, we can write Q=Q1+ Q2 . Suppose that each firm behaves as a “Cournot” competitor, that is, choose the optimal quantity maximizing the profits in a strategic way.(a) What would be the values of Q1, and Q2 in equilibrium? (b) Suppose firm 1 can “commit” its level of output in advance. In other words, if firm 1 announces to produce Q1, firm 2 needs to decide how much to produce assuming that firm 1 would indeed produce Q1. What’s the level of Q1 firm 1 would choose to maximize its profit?3 In a Cournot market with two firms, the inverse market demand curve is P=50-2Q, where Q=q1+q2(Firm 1’s output is ; Firm 2’s output is ). Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 14. If Firm 2 produces 12 units of output, how much should Firm 1 produce? Group of answer choices 3 6 0 122. Consider a two-firms Cournot model with constant returns to scale. Assume also that the inverse demand function is P = 100 – 2Q, with marginal cost equal to 20for both firms, where Q = q1 + q2 . a) Derive the Nash equilibrium of this model and compare it with Monopoly and Perfect competition.
- Need answer for part b only Zeus and Iron are the only two cement producers in Gotham. The cement they produce is essentially identical. In this market, each firm chooses the output level to produce and the price is determined by aggregate output (Cournot competition). The inverse demand for cement is given by P = 225 − Q/2 . Q is measured in tons and P is in euros. The marginal cost for Zeus is constant at 50 euros/ton. The respective cost for Iron is constant at 40 euros/ton. A technological innovation in the production process allows both firms to reduce marginal cost by 5 euros/ton. a) How much would each firm be willing to pay for the innovation, if it were the only firm to acquire it? b) Consider a situation where firms’ managers, simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to acquire the innovation or not, which costs 900 euros, and then compete in quantities. What is the equilibrium of this game, based on its payoff matrix?14.6. Product positioning and price competition. Consider a duopoly where horizon- tal product differentiation is important. Firms first simultaneously choose their prod- uct locations, then simultaneously set prices in an infinite series of periods. Suppose that firms collude in prices in the second stage and anticipate they will do so at the product-positioning stage. In this context, what do you expect the degree of product differentiation to be?.Question 4 Consider a duopoly market with 2 firms. Aggregate demand in this market is given by Q = 500 – P, where P is the price on the market. Q is total market output, i.e., Q = QA + QB, where QA is the output by Firm A and QB is the output by Firm B. For both firms, marginal cost is given by MCi = 20, i=A,B. Assume the firms compete a la Cournot.Note that marginal revenue for both firms is given by MRA=500-2QA-QB, MRB=500-QA-2QB. Describe what a best-response curve is and how to find it. Derive the best-response function for each firm. What are the equilibrium quantities? What is the total quantity supplied on this market? What is the equilibrium price in this market?