1 1st attemptTwo firms engage in Cournot competition in the Everlasting Gobstopper industry. The price elasticity of demand is -2. Firm 1 has aconstant marginal cost of $280.00 per unit, and fırm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $308.00 per unit. If the two firms are currently inequilibrium, what is firm 2's share of the market? Enter your answer as a decimal, rounded to two places if necessary.

The level of impact the price of a good has on its quantity demanded is referred to as the price…

1st attempt Two firms engage in Cournot competition in the Everlasting Gobstopper industry. The price elasticity of demand is -2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $280.00 per unit, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $308.00 per unit. If the two firms are currently in equilibrium, what is firm 2's share of the market? Enter your answer as a decimal, rounded to two places if necessary.

1st attempt Two firms engage in Cournot competition in the Everlasting Gobstopper industry. The price elasticity of demand is -2. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $280.00 per unit, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $308.00 per unit. If the two firms are currently in equilibrium, what is firm 2's share of the market? Enter your answer as a decimal, rounded to two places if necessary.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.10P: Inverse elasticity rule Use the first-order condition (Equation 15.2 ) for a Cournot firm to show...

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