A duopoly faces a market demand of p= 120 - Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC' =S10. Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC = S20. Calculate theoutput of each firm, market output, and price if there is (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Cournot equilibrium.The collusive equilibrium occurs where q, equalsand q, equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places)Market output isThe collusive equilibrium price is SThe Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q, equals and q2 equalsMarket output isFurthermore, the Cournot equilibrium price is S

Collusion is a non-competitive, secret, and sometimes illegal agreement between rivals which…

A duopoly faces a market demand of p= 120 - Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC' =$10. Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC? = $20. Calculate th output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Cournot equilibrium. The collusive equilibrium occurs where q, equals | and q2 equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places) Market output is The collusive equilibrium price i s The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where 9, equals O and q2 equals | Market output is Furthermore, the Cournot equilibrium price is s[

A duopoly faces a market demand of p= 120 - Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC' =$10. Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC? = $20. Calculate th output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Cournot equilibrium. The collusive equilibrium occurs where q, equals | and q2 equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places) Market output is The collusive equilibrium price i s The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where 9, equals O and q2 equals | Market output is Furthermore, the Cournot equilibrium price is s[

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.4P

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