A single bank is considering two options: First, it can make a $200,000 mortgage loan for a customer with a 10 percent probability of default, or second, it can buy a $200,000 security representing a bundle of 100 mortgage loans, which break down as shown in the table below. You can calculate the weighted risk for each firm category by multiplying the percentage of loans represented (for example, the first tier includes 25 loans, which is 25/100 = 25% of the total) times the probability of default on loans of that category. Instructions: Round your answers to three decimal places. a. Calculate the weighted risk for each type of loan, then add together the weighted risks to come up with an overall expected default risk for this financial investment. Number of Loans 25 25 15 35 Probability of Default (1) 3 12 1.5 5 Weighted Risk 1 Adding together the weighted risks, the expected default risk for the security is: b. If the bank is willing to take on only projects for which the default risk is 6% or less, it should choose the Click to select) bundle of mortgages single mortgage loan

A single bank is considering two options: First, it can make a $200,000 mortgage loan for a customer with a 10 percent probability of default, or second, it can buy a $200,000 security representing a bundle of 100 mortgage loans, which break down as shown in the table below. You can calculate the weighted risk for each firm category by multiplying the percentage of loans represented (for example, the first tier includes 25 loans, which is 25/100 = 25% of the total) times the probability of default on loans of that category. Instructions: Round your answers to three decimal places. a. Calculate the weighted risk for each type of loan, then add together the weighted risks to come up with an overall expected default risk for this financial investment. Number of Loans 25 25 15 35 Probability of Default (1) 3 12 1.5 5 Weighted Risk 1 Adding together the weighted risks, the expected default risk for the security is: b. If the bank is willing to take on only projects for which the default risk is 6% or less, it should choose the Click to select) bundle of mortgages single mortgage loan

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.5IP

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Deborah is at the casino and is considering playing Roulette. In Roulette, a ball drops into one of 36 slots on a spinning wheel. 17 of the slots are red, 17 are black, and 2 are green. Each slot is equally likely and occurs with probability 1/36. Deborah bets $1.00 on black. If the ball drops into a black slot she receives $2.00 and if it drops into a red or green slot, she receives nothing. a) The expected value of Deborah’s bet (after subtracting the $1.00 she bet) is $________________ b) Given that Deborah makes this bet, is she risk adverse, risk neutral, or risk loving?
"Jay, a writer of novels, just has completed a new thriller novel. A movie company and a TV network both want exclusive rights to market his new title. If he signs with the network, he will receive a single lump sum of $1,480,000, but if he signs with the movie company, the amount he will receive depends on how successful the movie is at the box office.The probability of a small box office earning $203,000 is 0.27. The probability of a medium box office of $1,660,000 is 0.49, and the probability of a large box office of $2,950,000 is 0.24.Jay can send his novel to a prominent movie critic to assess the potential box office success. It will cost $20,000 to get the novel evaluated by the movie critic.The movie critic can have either a favorable or unfavorable opinion. The movie critic's reliability of predicting box office success is as follows.If the movie will have a large box office, there is a 0.75 probability the critic will have a favorable opinion.If the movie will have a medium…
"Jay, a writer of novels, just has completed a new thriller novel. A movie company and a TV network both want exclusive rights to market his new title. If he signs with the network, he will receive a single lump sum of $1,460,000, but if he signs with the movie company, the amount he will receive depends on how successful the movie is at the box office.The probability of a small box office earning $210,000 is 0.27. The probability of a medium box office of $1,530,000 is 0.64, and the probability of a large box office of $3,190,000 is 0.09.Jay can send his novel to a prominent movie critic to assess the potential box office success. It will cost $21,000 to get the novel evaluated by the movie critic.The movie critic can have either a favorable or unfavorable opinion. The movie critic's reliability of predicting box office success is as follows.If the movie will have a large box office, there is a 0.61 probability the critic will have a favorable opinion.If the movie will have a medium…
Market Data Rate of Return Standard Deviation Treasury Bills 4.25% 0.00% S&P 500 12.00% 21.00% Required: Using the information in the table above and the varying risk aversions below, please calculate allocations to the risky and risk-free assets. (Use cells A5 to C6 from the given information to complete this question.) Risk Aversion Percent Allocated to the Market (S&P 500) Percent Allocated to Treasury Bills 4.00 2.00 1.50
Eunice, the industry analyst of H&M, wants to determine the propensity of Major Clothingcompanies toward risk. She was able to determine the utility distribution of H&M, Uniqloand Dickies. For H&M, If the expected payoff of a venture is a loss of 125,000, the utilityvalue is 0.00, if a loss of 75,000, the utility value is .2, if breakeven, the utility value is .5,if gain of 75,000 .8 and if gain of 125,000 utility value is 1. For Uniqlo, if loss of 125,000utility value is 0, if loss of 75,000 utility value is .1, breakeven is .4, if a gain of 75,000,utility value is .7 and if gain of 125,000 utility value is 1. For Dickies, if loss of 125,000,utility value is 0, if loss of 75,000, utility value is .3 breakeven is .6, if gain of 75,000, utilityvalue is .9 and gain of 125,000, utility value is 1. What is the propensity to risk of the threeinternet companies? Explain your graph.
A lottery has a grand prize of $1,000,000, 2 runner-up prizes of $100,000 each, 6 third-place prizes of $10,000 each, and 19 consolation prizes of $1,000 each. If a 4 million tickets are sold for $1 each, and the probability of any ticket winning is the same as that of any other winning, find the expected return on a $1 ticket. (Round your answer to 2 decimal places.
For a group of 300 cars the numbers, classified by colour and country of manufacture, are shown in the table. Black Silver White Korea 33 34 35 Japan 23 9 24 America 16 25 34 Germany 19 16 32 One car is selected at random from this group. Find the probability that the selected car is a black or white car manufactured in Korea. not manufactured in Japan. is a white car, given that it was manufactured in America. Are the events ‘Korea’ and ‘Black’ Mutually Exclusive? Justify your response. Are the events ‘Korea’ and ‘Black’ Independent? Justify your response
True/False a. Consider a strategic game, in which player i has two actions, a and b. Let s−i be some strategy profile of her opponents. If a IS a best response to s−i, then b is NOT a best response to s−i. b. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS NOT a best response to s−i, then a does NOT weakly dominates b. c. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, IS a best response to s−i, SO IS a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. d. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, is NOT a best response to some strategy profile of her opponents, s−i, NEITHER is a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. e. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS a best response to s−i, SO IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a. f. Consider the same game in (a). If a…
Find the values of Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) and Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) for all the cases below. . U(C) = C0.5. . U(C) = C2. . U(C) = 5×C. . U(C) = -C-2. . U(C) = -C-7. . U(C) = -e-7C. . U(C) = [1/(1-a)]×C1-a , where a is a constant.
Suppose the market for auto insurance is made of up two types of buyers: high-risk and low-risk. Buyers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for auto insurance plans, and sellers’ willingness to accept (WTA) when selling plans to each type of buyer, are outlined in a photo Assume now that there is asymmetric information and that insurance companies do not knowhow risky an individual buyer is. In the face of this uncertainty, they determine that the probability that a “walk-in” is high-risk is 0.75. What is the minimum price sellers are willing to accept when selling aninsurance plan? At this price, will low- and high-risk buyers both be willing to purchase this insurance plan? Explain. Be sure the mention adverse selection in your answer. Returning to the conditions outlined in Q1, suppose that buyers of auto insurance (high- and low-risk) were offered a $1,000 subsidy to purchase coverage. This would raise their WTP by $1,000. Would the market for both insurance plans clear after the…
Farmer Brown faces a 25% chance of there being a year with prolongeddrought, with zero yields and zero profit, and he faces a 75% chance of a normal year, with good yields and$100,000 profit. These probabilities are well-known. Suppose that an insurance company offered a droughtinsurance policy that pays the farmer $100,000 if a prolonged drought occurs. Assume that the farmer’sutility function is u(c) = ln(c). He has initial wealth of $40,000. What is the economic intuition on why X > Y? Confine your answer to at most three sentences.
In homes without working fire alarms, the chance of dying in a non-confined home fire is .0164 if there is a fire. In homes with working fire alarm, the chance of dying is .0115 if there is a fire.1 Similarly, the chance of a non-confined house fire occurring is about 0.0015 (= 92,450/125,000,000). So, all else being equal, the chances of dying in your home due to a non-confined house fire are 0.000025 and 0.000017, respectively, without and with a fire alarm. Noting that smoke alarms range in price from $15 to $60 a piece, can we use this data and the trade-off method to estimate a range in the value of a statistical life? If so, what are these values? Do they seem reasonable? Please show all of your work and provide a raionale