Answer the next question based on the following payoff matrix for a duopoly in which the numbers indicate the profit in thousands of dollars for a high-price or a low-price strategy. Firm X High Price Low Price X= $625 X = $725 Y = $625 Y = $475 X $475 X = $400 Y= $725 Y= $400 If both firms collude to maximize joint profits, the total profits for the two firms will be O A) $1,200,000. O B) $1,500,000. O C) $1,400,000. O D) $1,250,000. Firm Y Low Price High Price

Answer the next question based on the following payoff matrix for a duopoly in which the numbers indicate the profit in thousands of dollars for a high-price or a low-price strategy. Firm X High Price Low Price X= $625 X = $725 Y = $625 Y = $475 X $475 X = $400 Y= $725 Y= $400 If both firms collude to maximize joint profits, the total profits for the two firms will be O A) $1,200,000. O B) $1,500,000. O C) $1,400,000. O D) $1,250,000. Firm Y Low Price High Price

Economics:

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285859460

Author:BOYES, William

Publisher:BOYES, William

Chapter26: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13E

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