Cartels usually breakdown because of what? Cartels can only be effectively run if they use Game Theory software. They can't control the supply of the good or service. ● ● ● ● They can't control the market price. Usually there is one greedy firm in the cartel that will break the cartel agreement and sell at a lower price to grab as much market share as they can.

Cartels usually breakdown because of what? Cartels can only be effectively run if they use Game Theory software. They can't control the supply of the good or service. ● ● ● ● They can't control the market price. Usually there is one greedy firm in the cartel that will break the cartel agreement and sell at a lower price to grab as much market share as they can.

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7P

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Similar questions

When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term-that the incentives for individual members. to cheat would become too strong. More than fort),r years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons.
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