Consider a bargaining game with T = ∞ rounds of bargaining. At the beginning of each round the proposer makes an offer to split a surplus of size 1. If the responder accepts, the offer is executed, and the game ends with the

Exploring Economics
8th Edition
ISBN:9781544336329
Author:Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:Robert L. Sexton
Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 17P
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Consider a bargaining game with T = ∞ rounds of
bargaining. At the beginning of each round the proposer
makes an offer to split a surplus of size 1. If the responder
accepts, the offer is executed, and the game ends with the
payoffs determined by the offer. If the offer is rejected, the
game moves on to the next round, except in the last round,
where the game ends after rejection. If the game ends
without agreement then both players getting zero.
Here is the twist. The role of proposer and responder in
each round is determined randomly. At the beginning of
each round a fair coin is tossed. If it comes up heads P1
proposes in that round. If the toss comes up tails then P2
proposes in that round. Assume offers can be any
number. Notice there is no shrinking pie.
Consider an SPE of the game. In the equilibrium, what is
first offer made by the first proposer?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a bargaining game with T = ∞ rounds of bargaining. At the beginning of each round the proposer makes an offer to split a surplus of size 1. If the responder accepts, the offer is executed, and the game ends with the payoffs determined by the offer. If the offer is rejected, the game moves on to the next round, except in the last round, where the game ends after rejection. If the game ends without agreement then both players getting zero. Here is the twist. The role of proposer and responder in each round is determined randomly. At the beginning of each round a fair coin is tossed. If it comes up heads P1 proposes in that round. If the toss comes up tails then P2 proposes in that round. Assume offers can be any number. Notice there is no shrinking pie. Consider an SPE of the game. In the equilibrium, what is first offer made by the first proposer?
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