Consider a market with two firms managed by Harry and Vera. Under a cartel (both firms pick the high price), each firm earns a profit of $85. Under a duopoly (both firms pick the low price), each firm earns a profit of $70. If the two firms pick different prices, the high-price firm earns a profit of $25 and the low-price firm earns a profit of $100. This is depicted in the payoff matrix to the right. The outcome of the pricing game is Vera High Price Low Price O A. Harry and Vera both pick the high price. O B. Harry picks the low price and Vera picks the high price. OC. Harry picks the high price and Vera picks the low price. Harry $85 $100 High Price $85 $25 O D. Harry and Vera both pick the low price. $25 $70 The outcome identified above is a Nash equilibrium because neither firm has an incentive to Low Price $100 $70 O A. pick the high price given that the other player is picking the low price. O B. pick the high price given that the other player is picking the high price. OC. pick the low price given that the other player is picking the high price. O D. pick the low price given that the other player is picking the low price.

Consider a market with two firms managed by Harry and Vera. Under a cartel (both firms pick the high price), each firm earns a profit of $85. Under a duopoly (both firms pick the low price), each firm earns a profit of $70. If the two firms pick different prices, the high-price firm earns a profit of $25 and the low-price firm earns a profit of $100. This is depicted in the payoff matrix to the right. The outcome of the pricing game is Vera High Price Low Price O A. Harry and Vera both pick the high price. O B. Harry picks the low price and Vera picks the high price. OC. Harry picks the high price and Vera picks the low price. Harry $85 $100 High Price $85 $25 O D. Harry and Vera both pick the low price. $25 $70 The outcome identified above is a Nash equilibrium because neither firm has an incentive to Low Price $100 $70 O A. pick the high price given that the other player is picking the low price. O B. pick the high price given that the other player is picking the high price. OC. pick the low price given that the other player is picking the high price. O D. pick the low price given that the other player is picking the low price.

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16SQ

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